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Scott Hirst*
In 2012, the New York Stock Exchange changed its policies to prevent
brokers from voting shares on corporate governance proposals when they have
not received instructions from beneficial owners. Although the change was
intended to protect investors and improve corporate governance, it has had the
opposite effect: a significant number of U.S. public companies are no longer
able to amend important parts of their corporate charters, despite the support
of their boards of directors and overwhelming majorities of shareholders. Their
charters are frozen.
This Article provides the first empirical and policy analysis of the broker
voting change and its significant unintended consequences. I provide empirical
evidence that the broker voting change has resulted in the failure of more than
fifty charter amendments at U.S. public companies, despite board approval and
overwhelming shareholder support, and that hundreds more companies have
frozen charters as a result of the change. The rule change has also made it
more difficult to amend corporate bylaws and given some insiders a de-facto
veto in proxy voting contests. These costs substantially outweigh the negligible
benefits of the broker voting change. I compare a number of solutions to
address these problems and identify several that would be preferable to the
current approach.
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In 2011, a large U.S. public corporation put forward an amendment to its
charter, the central document establishing the internal rules of the corporation.'
The board of directors and management supported and recommended the
change. At the required shareholder vote on the amendment, more than 99% of
the votes cast were in favor of the amendment. But the amendment failed.
Directors, managers, and shareholders supported a change in the company's
charter, yet were unable to change it. The company's charter is frozen. This
result is the consequence of a 2012 change in New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) policies relating to broker voting rules,2 Information Memorandum 12-
4 (hereinafter the broker voting change). Although the broker voting change
was intended to protect investors and improve corporate governance and
accountability, it has had the opposite effect. This is the first article to analyze
the significant unintended consequences of the broker voting change, and to
identify the problem of frozen charters.
Approximately 85% of investors hold shares through brokers, and many
of those investors do not instruct brokers how to vote their shares at annual
meetings. Uninstructed broker votes therefore represent a substantial proportion
of the outstanding shares of many corporations (an average of 10% in my
sample). In order to protect shareholders from the potentially distortive effects
of voting by brokers (who do not have an economic interest in the corporation),
the NYSE, whose rules effectively govern broker voting,3 has progressively
limited the instances in which brokers may vote shares. Based on this concern,
in 2012, the NYSE restricted brokers from voting uninstructed shares on
charter and bylaw amendments.
Although the intention of the broker voting change was to protect
investors and enfranchise shareholders, it has done neither. By preventing
uninstructed broker voting, the rule change was intended to prevent voting
distortions. However, the rule change has instead created a different kind of
distortion.4 Preventing brokers from voting uninstructed shares means that none
1. The amendment ook place pursuant to a 2011 agreement with a client of the
Shareholder Rights Project, at which time I served as Associate Director of the Project. For further
information on the work of the Shareholder Rights Project during the years 2011-2014, see
Shareholder Rights Project, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON INSTITUTIONAL INV.,
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/index.shtml [http://perma.cc/8G6R-K2SL].
2. Although the change related to NYSE Rule 452, see infra note 3, it was
technically a change of interpretation of the rule, rather than a rule change itself, as is discussed
further in Section 1.B.3.
3. Broker voting is generally governed by NYSE Rule 452. See N.Y. STOCK
EXCH. INC., THE OFFICIAL CONSTITUTION AND RULES OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
R.452 (2016) [hereinafter Rule 452],
http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp-l_5-12 3&manual
=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F [http://perma.cc/MF9M-DBY8]; see also id. at R.452.10
(listing "when member organization may vote without customer instructions" and substantially
restating the provisions of Rule 452). See Section .C below for further details and discussion.
4. 1 develop a theory that explains these different kinds of distortions in Part 1I.
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of those shares will be voted in favor of the proposal, even though some of the
shares have beneficial owners that are in favor of the proposal. Where the
proposal failed, but would have passed had the uninstructed shares that
supported the proposal voted, the outcome is what I term a "distorted fail."
The main type of distorted fail results from the broker voting change is
frozen charters. Despite strong support from shareholders and directors, there
are a number of corporations that, because of high supermajority requirements
for amending parts of their charters, are unable to reach these thresholds
without uninstructed broker votes. Empirical data on the number of failed
charter amendments since the broker voting change was implemented reveals
the impact of the rule change. In the three years after the broker voting change
took effect, in 54 of the 63 companies where charter amendments failed despite
receiving overwhelming shareholder support,5 the company would have had
their amendments pass had the broker voting change not been implemented.6
Overall, the broker voting change has significantly increased the proportion of
charter amendments that fail despite receiving overwhelming shareholder
support and has increased the likelihood of failure for charter amendments in a
statistically and economically significant manner.
There are two other related kinds of distorted fail results from the broker
voting change. Similar to frozen charters, the elimination of discretionary
broker voting has prevented shareholders of a number of corporations from
amending the bylaws of those corporations. And in a number of other
companies, the prohibition on broker voting has left insiders with a de facto
veto right over certain charter amendments.
The unintended, shareholder-harming distorted fail results from the broker
voting change should be weighed against its intended consequence, of
preventing what I term "distorted passes" from uninstructed broker voting.
Uninstructed broker votes will result in a distorted pass when a majority of the
shareholders of the corporation prefer that a proposal fail, but uninstructed
broker votes in favor of the proposal cause it to pass.
5. I arbitrarily define "overwhelming shareholder support" as support from
shareholders representing 90% of votes cast. The 90% threshold has valence as a measure of
overwhelming support within corporate law-for instance, as the ownership threshold (albeit of
shares outstanding) above which a short-form merger procedure is permitted in DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 253.
6. See the analysis and assumptions discussed in Section I.B, infra. In particular,
this assumes that shareholders would have voted or not voted in the same proportions had the
broker voting change not been implemented. While it is impossible to tell whether this is the case,
there are significant reasons to suggest that this is the case. In particular, very little information
was released around the time of the broker voting change about i s effect on corporate governance
proposals, and there has been almost no discussion since that time. Given that most shareholders
were likely unaware of the effects of the change, there would have been no basis for them to
change their voting behavior. Anecdotal evidence from discussions with corporate governance




However, most charter amendments are strongly supported by
shareholders, and brokers generally follow management recommendations by
supporting these charter amendments. Thus, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, there would be no distortive effects of broker voting on charter
amendments. The number of cases where there may be distorted pass outcomes
is very small: there have been no charter amendments since the broker voting
change came into effect that would have had distorted pass outcomes had
broker votes been permitted, and only one other management proposal (0.12%
of all management proposals during that period).
In fact, the foregoing analysis significantly underestimates the true effect
of the broker voting change, because only a small number of charter
amendments go to a vote each year. I use a novel method to estimate the
number of companies that are affected by the consequences of the broker
voting change, using corporations' voting requirements and turnout in director
elections. I estimate that between 13% and 15% of U.S. corporations have been
rendered unable to amend part of their charters as a result of the broker voting
change. In addition, between 7% and 8% of corporations effectively have an
insider veto as a result of the broker voting change, and between 8% and 9.5%
of corporations now have board-only bylaw amendments as a result of the
broker voting change. I also estimate the number of companies where
eliminating broker voting has prevented distorted pass results, and find that,
based on current patterns of support for corporate governance proposals, the
broker voting change would prevent distorted pass results at only 0.1% of
companies. In short, the broker voting change was implemented to solve a
problem that-if it existed at all-had negligible effects.
These empirical results allow for an evaluation of the broker voting
change against its own implicit policy goals of protecting investors,
enfranchising shareholders, and improving corporate governance and
accountability. The substantial negative effects of the broker voting change in
creating distorted fail results -preventing charter and bylaw amendments
desired by shareholders and giving insiders a veto over charter amendments-
significantly outweigh its very limited benefits in preventing distorted pass
results.
The broker voting change failed so clearly against the policy goals it
references because charter amendment votes differ in two important respects
from director elections and executive compensation vote, which the broker
voting change did not reflect. First, as opposed to director election and
executive compensation votes, where shareholders may choose to express their
dissatisfaction with director or management compensation, shareholders
generally support charter amendments. This is due to the fact that directors
generally do not put forward charter amendments that are unlikely to garner
such support. Second, the manner in which proxy votes are tallied differs
markedly between the different types of proposals. Whether directors are
elected and executive compensation proposals pass depends on their level of
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support as a proportion of the votes cast at the meeting. However, charter
amendments require a proportion of shares outstanding in order to pass, and
often a supermajority of shares outstanding. As a result, excluding uninstructed
broker votes has a much more significant effect in a charter amendment
proposal.
Given these differences, it was inapposite to apply reasoning from recent
changes to Rule 452 to uninstructed broker voting on corporate governance
proposals. Such unintended results could have been prevented had the broker
voting change been implemented in a different manner. Whereas other changes
to broker voting rules in the past have involved lengthy processes including
public disclosure and comment, the broker voting change involved neither. Had
public comment been permitted, corporations, investors, or their representatives
may have pointed out the potential negative consequences of the broker voting
change.
After offering an empirical analysis of the broker voting change, I
consider the implications of the rule from a number of perspectives. From a
firm value perspective, the broker voting change prevents value-enhancing
changes to the corporation. From the contractarian framework of corporate law
scholarship, the broker voting change is problematic in that it changes an
implicit term on which the amendment provisions contained in corporate
charters rely, thereby changing the terms of the corporate contract from those
which the parties intended. Additionally, examining the broker voting change
from the perspective of directors and managers suggests that certain directors
and managers may actually prefer that particular charter amendments be
stymied by the broker voting change.7 Therefore, instead of empowering
shareholders, the rule change may disempower shareholders of some
corporations to the benefit of their managers.
There are a number of possible alternatives to address the distorted fail
results created by the broker voting change. Although the current pattern of
support for charter amendments and other corporate governance proposals
means there are very few potential distorted pass results, it is possible to
imagine alternative scenarios in which this is not the case. Any analysis should
therefore consider the likely effects of such solutions in both reducing distorted
fail results and avoiding distorted pass results.
The simplest solution, reversing the broker voting change, would
eliminate the distorted fail results of frozen charters, failed bylaw votes, and
insider vetoes created by the broker voting change. However, it would reinstate
the possibility of distorted pass results, albeit in what are likely to be very
limited numbers. Another possibility would be to implement strategies to
7. As 1 explain further in Section I.C, I do not suggest that the broker voting
change was implemented as a result of pressure from such issuers or their advisors on the NYSE
to implement the rule, as the interviews I conducted with NYSE and SEC officials suggest hat
this was not the case. See notes of interviews conducted with senior NYSE and SEC officials, on
file with the Yale Journal on Regulation.
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reduce the number of undirected broker votes, which would reduce both
distorted pass and distorted fail results. However, such efforts may be costly,
and are unlikely to provide a complete solution to the problem. A more
promising alternative, proportional voting, whereby brokers vote uninstructed
shares in the same proportion as other shareholders at the meeting or other
shareholder clients of the broker, has the possibility of eliminating both kinds
of distortion.
Finally, broker voting rules could be amended to allow broker voting on
certain types of corporate governance proposals where distorted fail outcomes
would otherwise be likely, but where distorted pass outcomes would not, such
as amendments to remove supermajority provisions, amendments that
shareholders generally support, or amendments for which a supermajority is
required.
These solutions offer the possibility of reducing the likelihood of distorted
fail results, while also minimizing the possibility of distorted pass results. In
order to avoid the procedural shortcomings involved in implementing the
broker voting change, any reform should take place through the NYSE
rulemaking process, with notice and public comment, and an SEC
determination that the new rule has the effect of protecting investors. In the
interim, the NYSE should reverse the broker voting change to prevent the harm
it is currently causing to investors.
The existing literature regarding charter amendments, broker voting, and
the effect of the broker voting change in particular on charter amendments,
remains extremely limited. Financial economists have tried to quantify the
extent of broker voting and its effects. Before the disclosure of broker non-
votes made such questions obsolete, two articles compared voting results for
routine and non-routine issues to estimate the extent of broker voting, and its
direction.8 In explaining why "management always wins the close ones," Yair
Listokin considered in passing the possible effects of distortions by broker
voting, and presented evidence about the effects of the 2003 limitation on
broker voting on executive compensation plans.9 A recent working paper also
considered the effects of the 2009 prohibition of uninstructed broker voting on
director elections." Following the release of Information Memorandum 12-4, a
number of lawyers and other practitioners noted the change," and several
8. Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 FIN. MGMT. 29 (2002); James A. Brickley et
al., Corporate Voting: Evidence from Charter Amendment Proposals, I J. CORP. FIN. 5 (1994).
9. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 159,179 (2008).
10. Ali C. Akyol et al., The Elimination of Broker Voting in Director Elections,
(2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973558 [http://perma.cc/U8J4-FVFU].
11. See, e.g., NYSE Restricts Broker Discretionary Voting for Certain Corporate
Governance Matters, CLEARY M&A & CORP. GOVERNANCE WATCH (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.clearymawatch.com/2012/01/nyse-restricts-broker-discretionary-voting-for-certain-
corporate-govemance-matters/ [http://perma.cc/93VV-H3VU]; Carol McGee, Broadening the
Range of 'Broker May Not Vote' Matters, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2012, 3:05 PM),
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12commentators speculated about its potential effects on charter amendments.1
However, the change went almost unremarked upon by academic researchers,
and the limited practitioner attention soon abated. This Article represents the
first economic and empirical analysis of the broker voting change.
http://www.law360.com/articles/307016/broadening-the-range-of-broker-may-not-vote-matters
[http://perma.cc/SQM7-FG97]; NYSE Further Restricts Broker Discretionary Voting, CTR. FOR
STUDY OF FIN. MKT. EVOLUTION (Jan. 28, 2012), http://csfme.org/Outreach/Lender-Directed-
Voting/nyse- further-restricts-broker-discretionary-voting [http://perma.cc/W3XE-BTTF].
12. See, e.g., NYSE Further Restricts Broker-Discretionary Voting Under Rule




[http://perma.cc/HX52-DWWW] ("[C]ompanies may find it more difficult to pass corporate
governance proposals (or defeat similar shareholder proposals) in the future. Proposals that require
a majority of the outstanding shares for approval will be particularly challenging ...."); NYSE
Further Limits Broker Discretionary Voting on Corporate Governance Proposals for the 2012
Proxy Season, FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP 1 (Feb. 26, 2012),
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/Final%20-%202-26-12%20-
%20NYSE%20Further%20Limits%2OBroker%2ODiscretionary%2OVotingl .pdf
[http://perma.cc/2N4F-ELAG] ("[C]ompanies will likely find it more difficult to pass all types of
proposals related to corporate governance, especially where a majority of the outstanding shares is
required for approval."); NYSE Tightens the Loop on Broker Discretionary Voting; What's the
Impact on Proxy Solicitations?, GEORGESON (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.georgeson.com/us/resource/Documents/GeorgesonReport_012612.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5X3E-RWB4] ("[T]he change could have a considerable impact on companies
seeking certain governance-related changes."); Matt Orsagh, New York Stock Exchange Quietly
Concedes More Power to Investors, CFA INST. MKT. INTEGRITY INSIGHTS (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2012/02/15/new-york-stock-exchange-quietly-
concedes-more-power-to-investors/ [http://perma.cc/JLW3-L6DX] ("Investors should be aware of
unintended consequences. The new rule will make it more difficult for companies with
supermajority requirements (such as 75% or 80% of shares outstanding) to obtain enough votes to
pass shareholder-friendly management resolutions."); NYSE Limits Broker Voting on Corporate
Governance Proposals, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/publications/nyse-revises-broker-voting-
on-corporate-governance-proposals/ [http://perma.cc/W3W2-HDNH] ("One practical implication
of the NYSE's new position is that companies may face increased difficulty in obtaining the
necessary support for these governance proposals. This could especially impact companies
seeking support for proposals requiring approval of a majority (or greater) of the shares
outstanding ...."); Louis Lehot et al., Public Company Control Alert: NYSE Acts To Further
Limit Broker Votes on Specified Corporate Governance Proposals, CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (Jan.
30, 2012), http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2012/01/public-company-control-alert-
nyse-acts-to-further-limit-broker-votes-on-specified-corporate-governance-proposals/
[http://perma.cc/4W2A-RMAF] ("[Tihe loss of broker discretionary votes may have a material
effect on the ability of a company to obtain shareholder approval for a company-supported
governance proposal."); Emily Chasan, NYSE Broker Voting Restriction Could Complicate
Proxies, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/01/31/nyse-broker-
voting-restriction-could-complicate-proxies/ [http://perma.cc/2PVV-X4Y2] ("The new rule makes
it ... harder for management to get a supermajority vote when trying to enact more significant
governance changes, such as altering anti-takeover provisions or destaggering board of director
appointments.").
13. One exception is the consideration given to the broker voting change by
Professor J. Robert Brown Jr., who speculated about its potential effects on the ability of
corporations to achieve quorum requirements. J. Robert Brown Jr., NYSE Rule 452 and Voting





The Article is structured as follows. Part I explains the charter amendment
process, broker voting, and the broker voting rules, including the recent
changes that established the policy on which the broker voting change was
based, and the broker voting change itself. Part II examines the kinds of
distortion created by broker voting-distorted pass outcomes and distorted fail
outcomes-and uses these to demonstrate the consequences of the broker
voting change on charter and bylaw amendments in the period since it was
implemented. Part III expands this analysis by considering those companies
that have been unwittingly affected by the broker voting change, but may not
yet have brought charter or bylaw amendments. Part IV evaluates the broker
voting change from its own perspective of investor protection, as well as
several other perspectives, and Part V considers potential solutions for
addressing the negative consequences of frozen charters.
I. Charter Amendments and Broker Voting
This Article examines the phenomenon of frozen charters, and links it to
the effect of recent broker voting changes. In this Part I, I first set out the
background of shareholder voting to approve charter amendments. I then focus
on part of the shareholder vote-voting of uninstructed shares by brokers. I
examine the rules that govern broker voting, most notably NYSE Rule 452, and
then move to consider recent changes to the broker voting rules, including the
broker voting change contained in Information Memorandum 12-4.
A. Amending Corporate Charters
The general procedure for amending the charter of a corporation is for the
board of directors of the corporation to approve an amendment to the charter,
and for directors to put forward a proposal that the amendment be approved by
a vote of shareholders.4 The proposal is then voted on at a meeting of
shareholders.15 If the amendment is approved, it is formalized by a filing with
the secretary of state of the corporation's state of incorporation.
The vote threshold required to approve an amendment varies from state to
state, and from company to company. Default rules vary between requiring a
majority of outstanding shares,'16 two-third of outstanding shares,7 and a
14. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1).
15. Generally, the meeting at which this occurs is the annual shareholders
meeting, though it can also be voted on at a special meeting of shareholders. Some states may
allow shareholder approval by written consent in lieu of a meeting. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 228.
16. Sixteen states, including Delaware, California, and New York, require
approval by a majority of outstanding shares as a default rule. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
242(b)(1). The other states in this group are Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington. See
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.504(a) (Ak.); CAL. CORP. CODE § 902 (Cal.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-283
(Haw.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6602 (Kan.); 13-C ME. REV. STAT. § 1003 (Me.); MICH. CORP. L.
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majority of the votes cast at a meeting at which a quorum of the majority of the
outstanding shares are present.1 i Each state permits a corporation to require a
greater vote requirement," and a significant number of corporations take
advantage of this provision with charter provisions requiring votes of, for
example, 66%, 75%, or 80% of outstanding shares in order to approve an
amendment to important parts of the charter.2 0 Although a supermajority
provision could require supermajority approval for amending any part of the
charter, they most frequently apply to anti-takeover provisions. Table 1 below
sets out the distribution of voting requirements for the sample of companies I
use in Part 111.21
STAT. § 450.1611 (Mich.); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.090 (Mo.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.390
(Nev.); N.J. STAT. § 14A:9-2 (N.J.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-13-2 (N.M.); N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 803
(N.Y.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18 § 1077 (Okla.); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1914 (Pa.); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS §
7-1.2-903 (R.I.); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.030.
17. Eight states require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the outstanding
shares as a default rule. The states in this group are Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10.20 (I11.); LA. STAT.
ANN. 12:31 (La.); MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS. § 2-604 (Md.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
156D, § 10.03 (Mass.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1701.71 (Ohio); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-10-103
(S.C.); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.364 (Tex.); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-707 (Va.).
18. Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia follow the provisions of the
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), which requires a majority of the votes cast at a
meeting at which a quorum of the outstanding shares is present. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
7.25(c). The states in this group are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE § IOA-2-10.03 (Ala.);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1003 (Ariz.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1003 (Ark.); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-110-103 (Colo.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-797 (Conn.); D.C. CODE § 29-308.03 (D.C.);
FLA. STAT. § 607.1003 (Fla.); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1003 (Ga.); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-1003
(Idaho.); IND. CODE § 23-1-38-3 (Ind.); IOWA CODE § 490.1003 (Iowa); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
271B.10-030 (Ky.); MINN. STAT. § 302A.135 (Minn.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-10.03 (Miss.);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-227 (Mont.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,118 (Neb.); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 293-A:10.03 (N.H.); N.C. GEN. SWAT. § 55-10-03 (N.C.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-19
(N.D.); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.437 (Or.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-1003 (S.D.); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-20-103 (Tenn.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-lOa- 1003 (Utah); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1IA, §
10.03 (Vt.); W. VA. CODE § 31D-10-1003 (W. Va.); WIS. STAT. § 180.1003 (Wis.); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 17-16-1003 (Wyo.).
19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4).
20. See, e.g., RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF CHESAPEAKE
ENERGY CORPORATION (Aug. 10, 2001) ("Notwithstanding anything contained in this Certificate
of Incorporation to the contrary, the affirmative vote of the holders of at least sixty-six and two-
thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the issued and outstanding stock having voting power, voting together
as a single class, shall be required to amend, repeal or adopt any provision inconsistent with
Articles V, VI, VII, VIII and this Article IX of this Certificate of Incorporation.").
21. As explained in Part 111, these are companies incorporated in the United
States that are part of the Russell 3000 index, which contains the largest 3,000 corporations listed
on exchanges in the United States. For a discussion of the composition of the Russell 3000 and an
explanation of why I use it, see infra note 75.
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Table 1: Voting Requirements for Charter Amendments at
U.S.-Incorporated Russell 3000 Corporations
Vote Standard Percentage Companies %
Votes Cast 50% 150 5.8%
50% 917 35.3%
50% - 59% 1 0.0%
60%-69% 874 33.7%
Shares Outstanding
70% - 79% 245 9.4%
80%-89% 392 15.1%
90%- 100% 17 0.7%
Total 2,596 100.00%
As Table 1 shows, 25.2% of the companies in my sample require approval
of 70% or more of the outstanding shares of the corporation to amend part of
their charters. Most supermajority requirements are a percentage of shares
outstanding, rather of the votes cast on the proposal. If all outstanding shares
were voted, these proportions would be the same. In reality, a substantial
percentage of shareholders do not vote, significantly reducing the proportion of
outstanding shares that are actually voted, which I refer to as "shareholder
turnout.22
The level of shareholder turnout in corporations varies with the level of
institutional ownership of the corporation.23 Of shares held by institutions, an
average of 90% were voted at annual meetings in 2013, whereas only 30% of
shares owned by individual or retail investors were voted.24 The distribution of
22. I exclude uninstructed broker votes from "shareholder turnout," so
shareholder turnout is the number of shares that are voted for, against, or abstain on a proposal
(but not uninstructed broker shares), divided by the number of outstanding shares of the
corporation.
23. Many institutional investors, including investment advisers and pension funds
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), have a fiduciary
duty to vote their shares. See, e.g., Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dept.
of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman Ret. Board, Avon Products Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988) (reprinted
at 15 PENS. REPrR. (BNA) 391); Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dept. of
Labor, to Robert Monks, Pres., Institutional S'holders Servs., Inc. 3 (Jan. 23, 1990) (reprinted at
17 PENS. REPTR. (BNA) 244); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Written Statements of Investment
Policy, including Proxy Voting Policy or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (July 29, 1994);
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of
Investment Policy Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (October
17,2008).
24. See 2013 Proxy Season Recap, Third Edition, PROXYPULSE (2013),
http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-PwC-ProxyPulse-Third-Edition.pdf
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shareholder turnout (excluding uninstructed broker votes) for director elections
from 2012 to 2014 for my sample is set out in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Shareholder Turnout in Director Elections for Russell 3000
Companies, 2012-14
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1
As Figure 1 makes clear, turnout is generally high-the median turnout is
81.0%. However, there are a substantial number of corporations that have
turnout below some of the significant supermajority thresholds mentioned in
Table 1-almost 50% of meetings had turnout below 80% of shares
outstanding. As a result, the treatment of uninstructed broker votes can be
central to whether or not charter amendments pass.
B. Broker Voting
Under state law, the right to vote shares of the corporation belongs to the
registered owner (or record holder) of the shares.26 While it is possible for an
[http://perma.cc/7MSY-2WQ5]. Note that the data published by Broadridge is based on shares
held in street name.
25. Figure 1 and similar figures showing distributions throughout this Article are
density histograms with bin width of 1%, rendered as line charts.
26. This is the person or entity that is listed in the share register of the
corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (describing the list of stockholders entitled to




investor to be directly registered as the owner of shares, most investors hold
shares through securities intermediaries27 such as a broker, bank, or custodian.
In these cases, the intermediary is the registered owner of the shares, and the
investor owns in "street name"-their interest as the beneficial owner is
recorded in the books of the intermediary.28 Investors generally buy shares
through brokers who place orders on their behalf through stock exchanges that
manage the transfer of the shares from the seller's broker.29 Although an
investor can request that their broker transfer the registration to the investor,
such requests are rare.30 As a result, brokers and other intermediaries are the
registered owners of approximately 85% of public company shares.3'
Shareholder voting takes place by proxy. The corporation distributes a
form of proxy and an accompanying proxy statement to shareholders.
Shareholders complete the form of proxy, authorizing certain proxy holders
(usually the directors of the corporation) to vote on their behalf, in favor or
against each proposal on the proxy form as the shareholder specifies.33 If the
shareholder is the record owner, they complete their own proxy form. However,
where the shareholder holds shares in street name, the broker is the registered
owner of the shares, and rules applicable to the broker govern the voting of the
shares.
Broker voting is governed by the exchanges of which the broker is a
member, including with respect to the voting of shares that are listed on other
exchanges.34 Because almost all brokers are members of the NYSE, the NYSE
27. "Securities intermediary" is defined in Act Rule 17Ad-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240 of
the General Rules and Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) to include a clearing agency registered under Section 17A of the
Exchange Act or a person, including a bank, broker, or dealer, that maintains securities accounts
for others.
28. For simplicity, I will generally refer to intermediaries as "brokers," though in
actual fact particular investors may have intermediaries that are brokers, banks, or custodians, or
some combination thereof. The Exchange Act and NYSE Rules use the term "broker-dealer." A
"broker" is defined as a person who undertakes transactions in securities for the account of others,
see 15 U.S.C. § 3(a)(4), whereas a "dealer" is one who buys and sells securities for their own
account, see id. § 3(a)(5).
29. The shares are often held by another intermediary called a "custodian." In the
case of large retail brokers, custodian entities are often under common ownership with the broker
entity.
30. Investors and brokers disfavor this approach, as it increases the difficulty,
cost, and time required to transfer the shares, and brokers may charge the investor an additional
fee to transfer the registration.
31. See, e.g., Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics: Topic One: Share
Ownership and Voting, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 23, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm [http://perma.cc/Q7X4-XPAN]
("Approximately 85% of exchange-traded securities are held by securities intermediaries.").
32. It is also possible that the corporation may give notice of where to access
proxy materials online, in lieu of sending the materials themselves.
33. For many corporations, shareholders may give their proxy electronically or
telephonically as well as in physical form.
34. See Rule 452, supra note 3; see also N.Y. STOCK. EXCH. INC. MKT. LLC.
COMP. GUIDE § 723 (relating to members of NYSE MKT exchange (formerly, the American
Stock Exchange), which is substantively identical to Rule 452). FINRA Rule 2251, which applies
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Rules govern essentially all broker voting in companies listed on U.S.
exchanges. Where a shareholder holds shares in street name, the broker is the
registered owner and receives the corporation's proxy materials.3 The broker
sends these proxy materials to the beneficial owner or their investment adviser,
either with a blank, signed proxy form, or a request that the beneficial owner
provide the broker with voting instructions.36 If the beneficial owner receives a
signed proxy form, they can vote by submitting it to the corporation, and the
broker has no further role in the voting of the proxy. If the beneficial owner
receives a request for voting instructions, they vote by returning instructions to
the broker by the tenth day before the company's meeting, and the broker votes
the shares as directed by the beneficial owner.37 The question of broker
discretionary voting arises in the situation where the broker has not received
voting instructions by this deadline.
Broker discretionary voting is important because many shareholders-
especially retail investors-do not instruct brokers how to vote their shares.
Political scientists have long observed that it is not economically rational for
individuals to vote in political elections,38 since acquiring information to vote is
costly and the likelihood of an individual influencing the outcome of an
election is vanishingly small. Shareholder proxy votes exacerbate this problem:
it is even less rational for a shareholder to vote. Because shareholder votes are
weighted by the number of shares held, it is even less likely that an individual
shareholder will influence the outcome of a shareholder vote .39 Furthermore,
the specialized nature of corporate governance matters makes it more difficult
for most individuals to gather information about how to vote. Shareholder
to brokers that are members of the NASDAQ exchange, does not provide substantive guidance
regarding whether a member may vote proxies if does not beneficially own, but provides that "a
member may give a proxy to vote any stock pursuant to the rules of any national securities
exchange of which it is a member provided that the records of the member clearly indicate the
procedure it is following." FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. MANUAL, Rule 2251 (2016),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display .html?rbid=2403&element-id=8834
[http://perma.cc/2X5M-L4VN].
35. These include the company's annual report and proxy statement, which
includes disclosure required by the Exchange Act about the matters to be voted on, and the proxy
card, to be sent in to the company to give a proxy to vote the shares.
36. N.Y. STOCK. EXCH. INC., supra note 3, R. 451. If the proxy solicitation
material is transmitted to the beneficial owner or its adviser twenty-five days or more before the
meeting, the statement must state that the proxy may be given fifteen days before the meeting at
the discretion of the owner of record of the stock.
37. NYSE Rule 452 supra note 3; see also NYSE Rule 452.10, supra note 3.
38. See, e.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a
Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135, 147 (1957) ("Therefore, we reach the startling conclusion that
it is irrational for most citizens to acquire political information for purposes of voting.").
39. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 520 (1990); Christopher Gulinello, The Retail-Investor Vote: Mobilizing Rationally
Apathetic Shareholders To Preserve or Challenge the Board's Presumption of Authority, 2010
UTAH L. REV. 547 (2010); Yaron Nili & Kobi Kastiel, In Search of "Absent" Shareholders: A
New Solution to Retail Investors' Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 56 (2016).
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voting is also less likely to have expressive significance than voting as a
citizen.'
Due to the fact that few individual investors vote, uninstructed broker
votes represent a substantial number of shares at many companies. For my
sample, the average level of uninstructed broker votes was 10.1% of
outstanding shares. Figure 2 below sets out the distribution of broker votes for
director elections from 2012 to 2014 for the companies in my sample.4'
Figure 2: Uninstructed Broker Votes in Director Elections of
U.S. Russell 3000 Companies, 2012-14
40. Cf. Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, Voter Choice Evaluating Political
Alternatives, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 185 (1984) (setting out a formal theory of voting other
than by interest). This notion is further explored in GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN E. LOMASKY,
DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE (1993).
41. The sample is those companies disclosing broker non-votes for annual
elections between 2012 and 2014.
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C. Broker Voting Rules
1. Rule 452
Discretionary broker voting is governed by NYSE Rule 452. The rule
provides that a broker that has sent proxy materials to the beneficial owner of
shares and has not received instructions on voting the shares by the deadline:
may give or authorize the giving of a proxy to [vote] such stock,
provided the person in the member organization giving or
authorizing the giving of the proxy has no knowledge of any contest
as to the action to be taken at the meeting and provided such action
is adequately disclosed to stockholders and does not include
authorization for a merger, consolidation or any other matter which
may affect substantially the rights or privileges of such stock.
42
The supplementary materials to Rule 452 give further guidance as to when
brokers are not permitted to vote without instructions from the beneficial
owner, and list 21 matters on which brokers are not permitted to vote
discretionarily. These include contested proposals, shareholder proposals
opposed by management, proposals relating to mergers, proposals involving
appraisal rights, preemptive rights, or voting provisions, proposals relating to
executive compensation, and proposals for the election of directors.4 3 Rule 452
reflects a concern about the distortive effects of broker voting, based on the
widely held understanding that brokers vote overwhelmingly in the manner
recommended by directors.4 The rule therefore prohibits broker voting in
situations where there is most concern about potential distortion-issues where
there is likely to be divergence between what managers recommend (and what
brokers are likely to support) and what shareholders might prefer-such as
mergers or contested elections.
2. 2003 and 2010 Amendments to Rule 452
Since the precursor to Rule 452 was adopted in 1937 4 5 the matters on
which brokers are permitted to vote discretionarily have changed several times.
42. NYSE Rule 452, supra note 3; see also NYSE Rule 452.10, supra note 3.
43. NYSE Rule 452.11 (listing "when member organization may not vote
without customer instructions").
44. See Report and Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New
York Stock Exchange, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 14 (June 5, 2006) [hereinafter Proxy
Working Group Report],
http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/files/NYSE%20Proxy%2OWorking%2OGrp%2
ORpt%206-5-2006.pdf [http://perma.cc/L74A-Z2FD]; see also Jennifer Bethel & Stuart Gillan,
The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 FIN.
MGMT. 29 (2002) (documenting this phenomenon).
45. See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 7.
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The most recent of these changes, in 2003 and 2010, help explain the rationale
for the changes made in the broker voting change.
In 2003, following the implementation of the requirement for shareholders
to approve equity compensation plans, Rule 452 was amended to prevent
broker discretionary voting on equity compensation plans.46 In approving the
rule change, the SEC considered the importance of ensuring that votes on
executive compensation matters reflect the views of beneficial shareholders and
concluded that the amendments served to protect shareholders and were in the
public interest.47
Following the implementation of the 2003 changes, the SEC created a
"Proxy Working Group' 48 to review the rules regulating the proxy voting
process, and in particular, Rule 452.4 9 The Proxy Working Group recognized
the potentially distorting effect of broker votes:
[T]he problem with broker voting is that it allows someone (i.e. the
broker) who does not have an economic interest in the corporation the
opportunity to vote on the corporation's business. A second problem is
that historically brokers have generally cast uninstructed shares
overwhelmingly in support of the board's recommendations, which
provides a significant advantage to the incumbent board in director
elections and other matters.50
The Proxy Working Group concluded that, in the interests of "better
corporate governance and transparency of the election process," broker voting
on uncontested elections should be eliminated.1
The Dodd Frank Act contained a provision requiring exchanges to prevent
their members from making uninstructed votes on elections of directors or
executive compensation matters, or any other significant matter as determined
by the SEC.52 The SEC subsequently approved amendments put forward by the
NYSE to prevent brokers from voting uninstructed shares in director elections,
effective January 1, 2010. In approving the amendments, the SEC concluded
that the rules would "better enfranchise shareholders, and thereby enhance
corporate governance and accountability" and would "protect investors and the
46. See Release No. 34-48108, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995 (June 30, 2003)..
47. See id. at 40,008-09.
48. The Proxy Working Group included representatives of a number of
corporations, institutional investors, and attorneys, and their sessions were also attended by
representatives of the SEC, the NYSE, and the National Association of Securities Dealers, the
predecessor of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
49. See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 1.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1906-07 (2010) (amending Section 6(b)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
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public interest.'53 The SEC subsequently approved NYSE rules prohibiting
uninstructed broker voting on executive compensation matters in September
2010, concluding that "the proposal will further investor protection and the
public interest" and "should enhance corporate governance and accountability
to shareholders.' 54 For these and other votes on which brokers do not vote
uninstructed shares, the number of uninstructed shares not voting is required to
be disclosed in the company's election results as "broker non-votes."55
The 2003 and 2010 amendments to the NYSE rules followed a formal
process for notice and comment. Amendments to NYSE rules (and those of
other exchanges) are governed by Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
19b-4 of the General Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder. These set
out comprehensive requirements for proposed amendments of exchange rules,
including that the proposed rule be filed in the Federal Register, and that public
comments be requested56 so that the public have a chance to provide
meaningful comment on the proposal.57 The SEC must consider the public
comments and determine whether the rule satisfies the requirements of the
Exchange Act and rules, including being designed "in general, to protect
investors and the public interest.'58 The proposed amendments therefore had
detailed explanatory materials, public comment,59 and lengthy consideration of
the rules and the comments by the SEC, on the basis of which the SEC
determined the rules had the effect of protecting investors and the public
interest.
3. Information Memorandum 12-4
The change in broker voting, which is the subject of this Article, took
place on January 25, 2012. On that date, the NYSE released Information
Memorandum 12-460 announcing that it would no longer treat certain corporate
governance matters as "Broker May Vote" for the purposes of Rule 452. The
53. Release No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293 (July 1, 2009) [hereinafter 2009
SEC Release].
54. See Release 34-62874, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,152 (Sept. 15, 2010) [hereinafter
2010 SEC Release].
55. See Form 8-K Current Report, Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 5.07(b), SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION [hereinafter
Form 8-K Current Report], http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [http://perma.cc/SP9D-
R36X].
56. See Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012); Form 19b-
4 of the Exchange Act Rules, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION [hereinafter Form 19-4],
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form 19b-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K9B-4GCS].
57. See Form 19b-4, supra note 56, at 2.
58. See Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2012).
59. With respect to the 2009 SEC Release, 153 comment letters were received
and reviewed. See 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,293.
60. Information Memorandum 12-4: Application of Rule 452 to Certain Types of





announcement stated that "[m]ore recently, the approach to broker voting of
uninstructed shares has narrowed through changes in [NYSE] rules as well as
through legislative action," and noted the restrictions on broker voting for
director elections and executive compensation. It then continued:
In light of these and other recent congressional and public policy trends
disfavoring broker voting of uninstructed shares, the [NYSE] has
determined that it will no longer continue its previous approach under
Rule 452 of allowing member organizations to vote on such proposals
without specific client instructions. Accordingly, proposals that the
[NYSE] previously ruled as "Broker May Vote" including, for example,
proposals to de-stagger the board of directors, majority voting in the
election of directors, eliminating supermajority voting requirements,
providing for the use of consents, providing rights to call a special
meeting, and certain types of anti-takeover provision overrides, that are
included on proxy statements going forward will be treated as "Broker
May Not Vote" matters.
61
As a result, since January 25, 2012,62 brokers have no longer been able to
vote uninstructed shares on charter amendments, as well as bylaw amendments
and other corporate governance proposals .63
In contrast to the previous broker voting changes to which it refers,
Information Memorandum 12-4 did not follow the thorough rulemaking
procedure contemplated by the Exchange Act.64 It was two pages in length, and
394 words. It gave very little explanation of the reasoning behind the changes it
implemented, or consideration of their potential effects. There was no advanced
notice of the changes in the broker voting change, nor any ability to publicly
comment. There was no public consideration of the rule change by the SEC,
and no conclusions were drawn as to whether the rule change would protect
investors and the public interest.65 These procedural shortcomings may explain
61. Information Memorandum 12-4, supra note 60.
62. The broker voting change does not indicate a phase-in period or start date. It
does indicate that it applies to proposals "that are included on proxy statements going forward." A
number of companies that had filed proxy statements prior to January 25, 2012 for meetings that
took place after that date that included charter amendments did not separate broker votes. The last
of these meetings, that of Qualcomm Incorporated, took place on March 6, 2012. See Current
Report (Form 8-K), QUALCOMM INC. (Mar. 9,2015).
63. Although all of the examples listed in the broker voting change are
amendments that reduce takeover defenses from subsequent amendment proposals where broker
votes have been excluded, it appears to have been interpreted to also apply to other kinds of
corporate governance amendments, such as ones that put in place takeover defenses.
64. Section 19 of the Exchange Act permits a proposed rule change to avoid the
normal process if designed by the exchange as "constituting a stated policy, practice, or
interpretation with respect to the meaning, administration, or enforcement of an existing rule of
the self-regulatory organization." 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A) (2012).
65. Interviews conducted with NYSE and SEC officials who held relevant
positions at the time of the broker voting change suggest that the SEC preferred that the NYSE
take this policy change approach, rather than propose a rule change, with the concomitant
procedural requirements described above (on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
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why the consequences described in Part II, and the broader effects described in
Part III, were not anticipated and avoided.6 6
II. Consequences of the Broker Voting Changes
This Part develops a theory for assessing the consequences of the broker
voting change. The treatment of uninstructed broker voting can distort the
outcome of shareholder votes in two ways-"distorted pass" results where
uninstructed broker voting is permitted, and "distorted fail" results where
uninstructed broker voting is not permitted. The main consequences of
distorted fails are frozen charters: many companies are now unable to amend
their charters because of the broker voting change. There are also two related
consequences -bylaws that are unamendable by shareholders, and a newfound
ability by insiders to wield a veto. All of these consequences reduce
shareholder welfare, the opposite effect of that which the broker voting change
intended. By contrast, the positive effect of the broker voting change-
preventing distorted pass results-has had a limited impact on shareholder
welfare 67
A. Broker Voting Distortions
Broker voting can cause distortions if brokers vote differently than if the
beneficial owners voted themselves. If shareholders of all shares held by
brokers gave voting instructions, there would be no distortion. However, if
shareholders do not give voting instructions, there will undoubtedly be some
divergence between the actual vote and the preferences of those shareholders.
68
To illustrate, assume that the proportion of outstanding shares held by
shareholders in favor of a proposal is 60%, and that holders of 15% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation do not give voting instructions to their
66. In an interview with the author, a senior official at the SEC at the time of the
broker voting change made clear that the SEC did not consider the effect of the change on
supermajorities, but approved of the broker voting change on the principle that preventing broker
voting improved the integrity of voting (notes of interview by the author with former SEC
Official, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
67. The issues I am discussing in this Part are separate from those discussed in
the existing literature on the problem of distortions and the prevention of efficient changes that
come from manager control of charter amendments. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments 102
HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989).
68. It can be argued that because shareholders do not vote, they must prefer to
abstain. Because the treatment of broker non-votes is akin to an abstain vote, there is therefore no
distortion. However, just because a shareholder makes a rational decision not to vote (for instance,
because the cost of informing themselves about the proposal exceeds the likely effect of their vote
if they are a small shareholder) does not mean that the shareholder would not prefer that the
proposal either pass or fail.
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broker.69 Consider first the situation where brokers are permitted to vote
uninstructed shares. Consistent with the evidence and widely held views that
brokers vote uninstructed shares overwhelmingly as directors recommend,70 I
will assume-for the simplicity of the example-that brokers vote 100% of
uninstructed shares, following director recommendations, in favor of
management proposals.7 ' 15% of the shares of the company will therefore be
voted by brokers in favor of the proposal. However, had the shareholders
themselves voted, only 60% of that 15%, or 9% of the outstanding shares,
would have voted in favor. As a result, broker voting has positively distorted
the total vote by 6%. Consider now the situation where broker voting is not
permitted. Now none of the uninstructed shares are voted in favor of the
proposal. As a result, prohibiting broker voting has negatively distorted the
total vote by 9%.
However, more important than the vote tally is the outcome of the vote,
which is binary-if the proposal receives more votes than the vote requirement,
the proposal will pass; otherwise it will fail. This binary outcome can be
distorted in two different ways, analogous to the analytical concepts of a "false
positive" and a "false negative." Either a proposal may not have sufficient
support to pass if undistorted, but distortive broker voting could cause it to pass
(which I term a "distorted pass"); or a proposal would have sufficient support
to pass if undistorted, but a distortive lack of broker voting could cause it to fail
(which I term a "distorted fail"). Given the evidence that brokers vote
overwhelmingly as directors recommend, broker voting can only be distortive
in the direction of director recommendations-which are almost exclusively in
favor of charter and bylaw amendments.72 As a result, permitting broker voting
can cause a distorted pass in circumstances where shareholders would prefer
that the proposal fail but broker votes increase the vote beyond the vote
required and cause the proposal to pass. In contrast, if shareholders preferred
the proposal to pass and broker votes increased the vote in favor, the proposal
would still pass, and there would be no distortion in the outcome. To illustrate,
assume that a proposal is supported by shareholders holding 45% of
outstanding shares and requires 50% to pass. If the outcome is not distorted, the
proposal will fail. However, if shareholders of 15% of outstanding shares do
not instruct their broker how to vote, and their brokers vote 100% of such
shares in favor of the proposal, then the percentage of outstanding shares in
69. Let us further assume, here and throughout the examples in this section, that
support for the proposal is uniformly distributed among those shareholders that vote and those that
do not instruct their broker how to vote.
70. See discussion infra Section II.B.I.
71. Almost all director recommendations are in favor of management proposals.
For a discussion of why this is the case, and data on the small number of exceptions, see infra
Section V.D.
72. There are a very small number of cases where directors have not given a
recommendation or recommended against corporate governance proposals they have approved.
See discussion infra Section V.D and Table 11 for further details.
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favor will be 85% x 45% + 15%, or 53.25%, and the result will be a distorted
pass."
The converse is true where broker voting is not permitted. If shareholders
holding more than the required proportion of shares prefer that a vote would
pass, but the prohibition on brokers voting uninstructed shares means that less
than the required proportion is actually voted in favor, then the result will be a
distorted fail. To illustrate, assume that a proposal is supported by shareholders
holding 90% of outstanding shares, and requires approval of 80% of
outstanding shares to pass. If the outcome is not distorted, the proposal will
pass. However, if brokers are not permitted to vote uninstructed shares, and if
shareholders holding 15% of outstanding shares do not instruct their broker
how to vote, then the percentage of shares in favor will be 0.85% x 90%, or
76.5%, and the result will be a "distorted fail."
Following from this analysis, the broker voting change, in disallowing
broker votes, has eliminated the possibility of distorted passes, but created the




The most significant distorted fail outcomes from the broker voting
change are frozen charters. Broker votes represent, on average, 10.4% of the
outstanding shares of corporations in my sample. For many corporations,
particularly those with high supermajority requirements for certain charter
amendments, turnout at annual meetings is such that the corporations are
unable to reach those requirements without broker votes. Therefore, as a result
of the broker voting change, those corporations are no longer able to amend
certain parts of their charters, even where directors and shareholders strongly
support such amendments. Their charters are frozen.
Although the great majority of charter amendments that go to a vote pass,
a significant number of companies have failed in their attempts to amend their
charters since the broker voting change came into effect. Of the 645 proposals
to amend corporate charters put forward by corporations74 between 2012 and
2014, 121 (19% of the total) have failed. Of those, 82 (13% of the total) have
failed despite receiving greater than 90% of the votes cast.7 5 The charters of
73. As further discussed in Section IV.A below, the broker voting change was
implemented to avoid such a result.
74. This excludes shareholder proposals, as they cannot by themselves effect
amendments to charters, and since the overwhelming majority of them are precatory, they
generally do not by themselves effect changes to bylaws or corporate governance policies.
75. Data for results discussed in this Section is drawn from the FactSet
TrueCourse, Inc. SharkRepellent.net Proxy Database. The FactSet SharkRepellent database
contains data for approximately 4,000 U.S. public companies, including those in the Russell 3000
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these companies are frozen. These charter amendments generally related to the
removal of takeover protections,76 such as declassification of the board or
reductions in supermajority requirements to amend the company's charter or
bylaws or take other corporate action.77
A company will have a frozen charter if the percentage of votes cast in
favor of the proposal is greater than 90%," and the percentage of outstanding
shares voted in favor for the proposal is less than the percentage of outstanding
shares required for charter amendments .9
Take, for instance, the case of Teradata Corporation. At the corporation's
2012 annual meeting, the corporation put forward a management proposal to
declassify the corporation's board of directors.8 The directors of the
corporation recommended that shareholders vote in favor of the resolution,81
and 99.6% of shareholders voting at the meeting voted in favor of the
indices. The Russell 3000 index covers the largest 3,000 U.S. companies, which according to the
publisher of the index, Russell Investments, comprises 98% of the investable U.S. equity market.
As of May 29, 2014, the market capitalization of companies in the Russell 3000 index ranged
from $751 billion to $177 million. See RUSSELL INDEXES, Market Capitalization Ranges (May 29,
2015), http://www'russell.com/indexes/americas/tools-resources/reconstitution/market-
capitalization-ranges.page [http://perma.cc/XNG4-DT7N]. There are approximately 700
additional companies covered by SharkRepellent, but because the database was originally set up
to track poison pills, many of the companies included are those that are outside the Russell 3000
index but have poison pills. To avoid biasing my sample, I limit my consideration here to
companies in the Russell 3000 at the time of the meeting where the proposal was considered.
Since charter amendment rules are governed by place of incorporation, I exclude non-U.S.
companies from my sample.
76. Many of the other proposals that failed (i.e., those that received less than 90%
support) were attempts to add takeover protections of the kind that are generally disfavored by
shareholders.
77. This can also be expressed algebraically. Throughout this article, I will use
alpha (a) to represent a proportion of outstanding shares, with a subscript to represent the
numerator-so ct,, for the proportion of outstanding shares in favor of a proposal, ab, for the
proportion of outstanding shares that are uninstructed broker votes (or "broker non-votes"), (to for
the turnout as a proportion of outstanding shares, and ct.q for the proportion of outstanding shares
required for a vote to be approved. I will use beta (PI) to represent a proportion of votes cast (i.e.,
votes cast for, against and abstained, but not including broker votes)-for instance, 3fo, for the
proportion of votes cast in favor. Where necessary, I will use theta (0) for the raw number of
votes-for instance, 0 fo, for the number of raw votes cast in favor.
78. Note that the choice of 90% is arbitrary. It is intended as a level to
demonstrate that an overwhelming proportion of shareholders are in favor of a proposal. As the
threshold is lowered, more of the 121 charter amendments that failed will be defined as having
frozen charters, although slightly lower proportions of those are likely to have resulted from the
broker voting changes.
79. Expressed algebraically: Po > 0.9 and ctfa , < aq.
80. Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), TERADATA CORP. 64 (Mar. 1,
2012). The corporation had previously received a shareholder proposal was put forward by the
State of North Carolina Equity Investment Fund Pooled Trust, which was represented by the
Shareholder Rights Project. See Outcomes of Proposals for the 2012 Proxy Season,
SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT (2012), http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/2012-declassification-
proposals.shtml [http://perma.cc/F2RE-W7D4]. The management proposal was put forward
pursuant to an agreement with the proponent, with the proponent agreeing to withdraw the
shareholder proposal if the corporation put forward the management proposal. I served as the
Shareholder Rights Project's Associate Director and assisted with the proposal, and with
subsequent engagement with Teradata.
81. TERADATA CORP., supra note 80, at 5.
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proposal.8 2 However, the shares voted constituted only 75.9% of the shares
outstanding as of the record date. The corporation's charter required a vote of
80% of outstanding shares to amend the classified board provision, so the
proposal failed.
To what extent are these frozen charters due to the broker voting change?
Consistent with the views of the NYSE Proxy Working Group and the evidence
of Bethel and Gillan that brokers overwhelmingly follow management
recommendations, let us again assume that 100% of broker votes would vote in
accordance with management recommendations if they are permitted to vote.
83
Using this assumption, we can describe the counterfactual situation where the
broker voting change had not come into effect. In that case, the percentage of
outstanding shares in favor for each company would be the percentage actually
voted in favor plus the number of broker votes. Therefore, a frozen charter will
be the result of the broker voting change where the percentage of shares
outstanding voted for, plus the percentage of broker votes is greater than the
vote requirement.84
To illustrate, consider the example of the management proposal to
declassify the board of directors of Akamai Technologies, Inc. put forward in
2013.85 The proposal received the support of 73.2% of the shares outstanding.
However, the voting requirement for the proposal to pass was 75%.
Uninstructed broker votes represented 10.9% of shares outstanding. Had those
shares been voted in favor of the proposal by brokers, the total in favor (Cafor+
CEbv) would have been 84.1%, and the proposal would have passed.
Table A.1 in Appendix A lists the companies where charter amendments
have failed since the broker voting change took effect (from 2012 to 2014). It
reveals that, of the charter amendments voted on since the broker voting
change, in 54 of the 63 company-years8 6 (86%) where proposals failed despite
receiving at least 90% support, the company would have had at least one
proposal pass if the broker voting change had not applied.87
82. Current Report (Form 8-K), TERADATA CORP. 2 (Apr. 26, 2012).
83. In the event that there were no distortion from broker voting - for instance, if
there were proportional voting as discussed in Section V.C, the proportion voting in favor would
not be 100% of the broker vote, but the proportion of the broker vote represented by P,,, so the
proposal would pass if tfor + Pfor.bv > c(re.
84. Expressed algebraically: Pfor > 0.9 and cfo, < Qroq and (r. + obv > C(req
85. See Current Report (Form 8-K), AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (May 15,
2013). The proposal was brought pursuant to an agreement with the Illinois State Board of
Investment, which had previously submitted a shareholder proposal to the corporation. The
Illinois State Board of Investment was represented by the Shareholder Rights Project. See
SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, supra note 80.
86. 7 of the 50 companies listed in Panels 1-3 of Appendix A had proposals fail
despite receiving more than 90% support in two different years, and three companies had
proposals fail in all three years.
87. One of these companies, NYSE Euronext, had two charter amendments in
2013, where one would have failed and the other one would have passed if the broker voting
change had not applied. Of the other companies, ModusLink Global Solutions, Inc. failed to
disclose the number of broker votes, and L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc. claimed that a
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To put this into historical perspective, Figure 3, below, shows the
proportion of management proposals that failed despite receiving greater than
90% support of votes cast from 2005 to 2014.
Figure 3: Percentage of Companies Bringing Proposals
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The average percentage of companies with proposals receiving 90%
support that had proposals fail from 2005 to 2011 was 2.7%. Had broker votes
been permitted from 2012 to 2014, I estimate that an average of 2.8% of
companies with proposals receiving 90% support would have failed during that
period. However, without broker votes, the actual average jumped to 13.1%
over that period.
Another way of examining the effect of the broker voting change on
frozen charters is to consider whether the likelihood of failure for proposals
increased following the implementation of the rule. A regression (described in
Appendix B) of whether charter amendments pass or fail, dependent on
whether the vote took place after the broker voting change, shows that the
timing of the vote is strongly significant (at the 1% level) in determining the
unanimous vote was required to approve the proposal. See Current Report (Form 8-K), NYSE
EURONEXT (Apr. 25, 2013); Current Report (Form 8-K), MODUsLINK GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, INC.
(Mar. 12, 2013); Current Report (Form 8-K), L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, INC. (Apr. 30,
2013).
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probability of the vote failing, and that the likelihood of a proposal failing
increased by 4.9% after the broker voting change came into effect.
These results demonstrate that the broker voting change had a significant
and economically meaningful impact on both the likelihood of amendment
proposals failing and on the number of amendment proposals that have actually
failed.
2. Shareholder-Unamendable Bylaws
So far, the discussion has focused on the effect of the broker voting
change on charter amendments. The rule change also applies to bylaw
amendments, which differ from charter amendments in several important
respects.
While board approval is necessary to amend a charter,88 state law permits
the bylaws of corporations to be amended by action of shareholders, without
the approval of the board.89 A significant number of corporations have bylaws
that can be also amended by the board of directors without a vote of
shareholders.90 Bylaws therefore provide protection for shareholders in the
event of a disagreement between the shareholders and directors regarding
whether a certain bylaw amendment is in the best interests of shareholders.9'
However, in the same way that the broker voting change has resulted in
shareholders being unable to approve charter amendments, it has also resulted
in shareholders of many corporations being unable to amend bylaws
amendments.
Take, for example, the case of insurance company Cigna Corporation. The
corporation has a classified board as stipulated in the bylaws of the corporation.
Following receipt of a shareholder proposal,92 the corporation put forward a
management proposal to amend the bylaws of the corporation to declassify the
board of directors at its 2012 annual meeting.93 The board of directors of the
corporation made no recommendation on the proposal, although it stated that it
88. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 241.
89. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a).
90. See, e.g., Monsanto Co., Amended and Restated Bylaws § 67 (Jan. 11,2016)
(requiring a vote of 70% of outstanding shares to amend the bylaws, but allowing amendment by
the vote of a majority of the Board of Directors). A notable exception in Delaware is for bylaw
provisions classifying the board of the corporation, which can only be added upon a vote of
stockholders of the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (b).
91. In practice, instances of shareholders attempting to unilaterally amend the
bylaws of a corporation are rare. Only 10 shareholder proposals submitted from 2012 to 2014
(0.7% of shareholder proposals submitted during that period) were binding bylaw proposals. See
RAJEEV KUMAR GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 14,22 (2014). For a
discussion of the reasons why this is the case, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private
Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 Bus. LAWYER 329 (2010).
92. The shareholder proposal was put forward by the Ohio Public Employees
Retirement System, which was represented by the Shareholder Rights Project. See SHAREHOLDER
RTS. PROJECT, supra note 78.
93. Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), CIGNA CORP. 67 (Mar. 16, 2012).
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"continues to believe that the classified board structure has been and remains in
the best interests of the Company and its shareholders."94 95% of the shares
voted at the meeting were in favor of the proposal . However, these constituted
only 72% of the outstanding shares of the corporation. A vote of 80% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation was necessary to amend the bylaw
provision establishing the classified board.96 9.2% of the outstanding shares
were uninstructed broker votes and did not vote at the meeting. After continued
engagement with the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, including a
second shareholder proposal requesting declassification of the board,97 the
directors of the corporation exercised their power to amend the bylaws without
the need for shareholder approval to remove the classified board provision.
98
Table A.4 in Appendix A lists the 10 companies where bylaw
amendments that received greater than 90% support of votes cast have failed
since the broker voting change came into effect, and shows that 9 of the 10
companies would have had their bylaw amendment pass if the broker voting
change had not applied. This represents a lower number than the number of
frozen charters because there are fewer bylaw amendments put forward for
shareholder approval than charter amendments. Furthermore, in some of those
cases, boards could also act unilaterally to amend the bylaws. However, as
above, the effect has been to reduce the number of corporate governance
changes preferred by shareholders.
3. Insider Vetoes
Just as the broker voting change has made it impossible to amend parts of
the charters of many corporations, it has also granted insiders a new veto
power-i.e., situations in which all of the shareholders could formerly have
amended the charter if they so desired, but whereby an insider block can now
prevent the company from amending its charter.
To illustrate, consider the case of Cerner Corporation. At its 2013 annual
meeting of shareholders, the company put forward a management proposal to
amend its charter to declassify its board of directors.99 The company had in
place a supermajority requirement requiring a vote of 80% of outstanding
shares to amend the relevant provision of its charter. The proposal received the
94. Id.
95. Current Report (Form 8-K), CIGNA CORP. 2 (Apr. 25, 2012).
96. See Amended and Restated Bylaws, CIGNA CORP. 20 (Oct. 26, 2010).
97. The Shareholder Rights Project represented the Ohio Public Employees
Retirement System in connection with this engagement and the shareholder proposal. See Lucian
Bebchuk et al., Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 178
(2013).
98. Current Report (Form 8-K), CIGNA CORP. 2 (Dec. 12,2012).
99. See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), CERNER CORP. (Apr. 15,
2013). This proposal resulted from engagement by a client represented by the Shareholder Rights
Project, discussed further at supra note 1.
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support of 70% of shares outstanding (representing 86% of the votes cast) and
failed.00 About 7.5% of shares outstanding were uninstructed broker shares,
which did not vote. With uninstructed brokers prohibited from voting, there
were only 93% of the shares outstanding available to vote. According to its
2013 proxy statement, the officers and directors of Cerner held 14% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation.101 If all of the directors and officers
opposed an amendment proposal, even if all other shareholders voted in favor
of the proposal, it could receive at most 79% of the vote, insufficient to amend
the relevant provisions of the charter. As a result of the broker voting change,
directors and officers had a veto over amendments to those provisions of the
charter.
Let us assume that insiders generally vote, and that their votes are
therefore included in shareholder turnout. Insiders will have a veto if a vote will
pass if they vote, but will not pass if they do not vote, i.e., shareholder turnout
is greater than the vote requirement, but shareholder turnout less the proportion
of shares held by insiders is less than the vote requirement.0 2 This will be the
result of the broker voting change if the shareholder turnout less the proportion
of shares held by insiders plus uninstructed broker votes would be greater than
the vote requirement."3
The possibility of insiders vetoing charter amendments is especially
problematic for votes on proposals such as anti-takeover amendments, where
managements' preferences may diverge acutely from the preferences of most
shareholders. Anti-takeover amendments represent a large proportion of the
charter amendment votes that fail despite receiving strong shareholder
support.'0 4 It is possible that shareholders in general prefer to amend the charter
to remove anti-takeover defenses, as the threat of a takeover may encourage
management o perform more effectively, and shareholders may benefit from
the potential premium paid in the case of a takeover.0 5 Consequently,
shareholder proposals put forward in 2014 requesting that companies remove
classified boards, a key takeover defense, received average support of 81% of
votes cast.0 6 However, insiders-managers-are likely to prefer not to amend
such charter provisions, for corresponding reasons-the threat of a takeover
that might lead to their replacement will reduce their job security, and put more
100. See Current Report (Form 8-K), CERNER CORP. (May 24, 2013).
101. See CERNER CORP., supra note 99.
102. a, > ct,,q anda1 0 - Cins < oreq"
103. a0w > aq and a,, - a , < arq and cc,, - a.- + ab. > Ca,q.
104. In my dataset, 88.7% of the charter amendment proposals that failed despite
receiving more than 90% of votes cast were proposals to reduce takeover protection.
105. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (introducing the concept of a market for corporate control); Michael
C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (analyzing the effects of takeovers); Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their
Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21 (1988) (summarizing the evidence of the effects
of takeovers).
106. See GEORGESON, supra note 91, at 20.
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pressure on them to perform than they may otherwise prefer. In these cases, an
insider veto would allow managers to stymie a charter amendment hat would
otherwise be value-enhancing for the substantial majority of shareholders of the
company.
So far I have been describing the set of negative consequences of the
broker voting change's elimination of broker voting, the distorted fail results. I
now turn to consider the positive effects the broker voting change has had in
eliminating distorted pass results.
C. Distorted Passes
As described in Part I, the broker voting change restricted broker voting
on corporate governance matters, such as charter amendments, based on a
concern that broker voting could distort the outcomes of shareholder votes
where shareholders disagree with management recommendations. In the
terminology coined in Section I.A, these are distorted pass results. In this
Section, I consider the positive consequences of the broker voting change in
eliminating such distorted pass proposals.
In order to evaluate this scenario, it is necessary to consider the
preferences of the shareholders as a whole, including those who hold their own
shares and do not vote, and those that hold their shares through a broker and do
not instruct their broker how to vote. Because non-voting shareholders do not
vote, their preferences are necessarily unknowable. It is also difficult to gather
data on whether the characteristics of non-voting shareholders differ from other
shareholders, and therefore whether their preferences are likely to differ from
other shareholders. In the absence of any basis on which to believe otherwise, I
will assume that the preferences of shareholders that do not vote (and do not
instruct their brokers to vote) are the same as the preferences of the
shareholders that do vote.107 As a result, I take the proportion of votes cast that
are in favor of a proposal°8 as an indicator of the preferences of all
shareholders with respect to the proposal.
The criterion for determining whether a vote would have been positively
distorted by broker votes will vary between companies that have "shares
outstanding" and "votes cast" requirements. For a company with a vote
requirement that is a percentage of shares outstanding, a vote would be
distorted by broker votes if less than 50% of votes cast are in favor of the
107. This is consistent with the discussion in Section 1.B, which states that many
shareholders do not vote because it is not rational for them to gather information regarding the
vote. The assumption is consistent with the view that, if the group of shareholders that do not vote
had spent time to inform themselves about the best voting outcome, the proportion of those
shareholders that would vote in favor would tend towards the proportion of the shareholders that
are well informed about the vote that voted in favor.
108. This corresponds to the variable 3ror. I include in "votes cast" votes to
abstain, as well as votes for and against.
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proposal, but the votes cast in favor of the proposal plus broker votes would be
greater than the vote requirement.
10 9
Table A.3 of Appendix A shows the nine proposals put forward from
2012 to 2014 that received support of less than 50% of votes cast. Of those
proposals, seven required a majority of votes cast for approval,110 and two
required a majority of outstanding shares. As Table A.3 shows, allowing broker
voting would have distorted the outcome of only one of these proposals, that of
Pacific Sunwear of California, Inc. The proposal required a majority of votes
cast. 48% of votes cast were in favor of the proposal, which failed. Had the
12% of outstanding shares held by brokers been voted in favor of the proposal,
55% of votes cast would have been in favor, and the proposal would have
passed. Note that the percentage of votes cast was already very close to 50%. In
the other six instances, the vote was not close enough to 50% for broker votes
to have distorted the outcome. As a result, it is difficult to conclude that the
broker voting change has had a significant effect in preventing distortion of
shareholder voting on management proposals.
The very small number of management proposals where a majority of
votes cast were against the proposal is to be expected. A management proposal
requires the approval of directors. Directors must believe that the proposal is in
the best interests of the company;1 . this may be more difficult to establish for
those proposals that are widely opposed by shareholders. In addition to their
legal duty, bringing a management proposal is costly-directors must spend
time considering the proposal, often seek legal advice regarding the proposal,
and must approve disclosure regarding the proposal for the proxy statement.
The failure of a management proposal may also have negative reputational
costs for directors and managers.
As a result of these factors, directors are unlikely to put forward a
management proposal that they think is unlikely to succeed. In addition,
shareholders generally follow directors' recommendations, unless they have
reason to believe that interests of directors differs from their own. One such
109. In other words, Pr < 0.5 and Cfor + by > (rrq. For those companies that have
a vote requirement that is a percentage of votes cast, a vote would be distorted by broker votes if
less than 50% of votes cast are in favor of the proposal, and the number of votes cast in favor and
broker votes (as a proportion of all votes cast and broker votes - Ifo,,bv) is greater than the vote
required (Pre,), i.e.: Por < 0.5 and 13fo,*bv > P rq. Since adding broker votes changes the denominator
as well as the numerator of the percentage of votes cast, Parrbv is calculated as the it total number
of votes cast in favor (0or) plus the total number of broker votes (0b,), divided by the total number
of votes cast for (0,or), against (0.g), abstained (0,b) and by brokers (0b) For example:
Ofor+Ob,
for+br ~Of r+ Oag +Ob + Ob "
110. Five proposals were to approve the use of a shareholder rights plan (i.e.
poison pill); because shareholder rights plans are not contained in the charter, they only require
the approval of a majority of votes cast. Green Plains Renewable Energy, Inc. is an Iowa
company, and Iowa follows the Model Business Corporation Act, where the vote requirement to
amend the company's charter is a majority of votes cast. See sources cited in supra note 18.
111. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) ("[The] board of directors shall
adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability .... ").
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situation may occur with an amendment relating to takeover defenses, where
directors and managers may have self-interested reasons for their
recommendation. Consistent with this theory, all seven failing proposals that
received less than 50% support from shareholders were proposals to authorize
takeover defenses."2 As a result of these factors, there are very few
management proposals that fail because of low levels of shareholder support,
and so the likely magnitude of the risk of distortion by the inclusion of broker
votes is extremely limited.
Figure 4 below shows the distribution of shareholder support for the 851
management proposals that were voted on at U.S.-incorporated Russell 3000
companies between 2012 and 2014.
Figure 4: Distribution of Shareholder Support for
Management Proposals 2012-14
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As Figure 4 shows, most management proposals receive very high levels
of support-the median level of support was 98.6%. Only the seven proposals
listed in Table A.3 of Appendix A, 1.1% of the total, received support of less
than 50% of votes cast. Since proposals can only be distorted if they receive
less than 50% support, and the likelihood of receiving less than 50% support is
extremely low, the chances of distortion occurring as a result of broker voting
are also extremely low.
112. Well-advised corporations are likely to understand that, in the absence of a
large blockholder who is in favor of the proposal, the likelihood of such proposals passing may be
low and are less likely to bring a proposal. Six of the nine companies-all except Cameron
International Corporation, Healthcare Trust of America, Inc., and Wynn Resorts Ltd-are small
capitalization companies (outside the Russell 1000), and may have not have had access to high-
quality advice regarding the likelihood of success of the proposals.
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A single management proposal since the broker voting change came into
effect could have resulted in distortion, that of Pacific Sunwear of California,
Inc. in 2012. In that case, the board of directors brought a proposal to ratify a
shareholder rights plan (commonly known as a poison pill) that the board had
adopted the previous year."l3 The proposal did not amend the charter or bylaws,
and required only 50% of votes cast to be in favor. The corporation had a
number of significant blockholders, including a shareholder with 29.8% of the
voting power, a private equity fund with 19.9% of the voting power, which
collectively appear to have been instrumental in putting in place the poison pill,
and a hedge fund with 14.7% of the voting power, which appears to have been
disadvantaged by the poison pill." 4 The directors, including representatives of
the two largest holders, recommended in favor of the proposal; ISS
recommended against the proposal. Shareholders representing 48.4% of the
votes cast voted in favor of the proposal, which failed."5 12.8% of the votes
present at the meeting were uninstructed broker votes, and did not vote. 16 Had
even a quarter of the broker shares been voted in favor of the proposal, it would
have passed." 1
7
Pacific Sunwear's potential distorted pass represents 0.12% of the
management proposals brought during this period. This is lower than the
chances of a company having its charter frozen by an order of magnitude, and
therefore the benefits of avoiding distorted passes are significantly outweighed
by the costs of the distorted fail effects of the broker voting change.
III. Companies Affected by the Broker Voting Changes
In Part II, I confined my analysis to amendments that have been brought
to a vote since the broker voting change was implemented. However, since only
a small proportion of companies have brought such proposals to a vote (12% of
my sample), the results presented in Part II underestimate the true effects of the
broker voting change. In this Part, I consider the effects of the broker voting
change on those companies that have not brought such a proposal to a vote.
113. See Definitive Proxy Statement, PAC. SUNWEAR OF CAL. INC. 23 (May 4,
2012).
114. Id. at 28.
115. Current Report (Form 8-K), PAC. SUNWEAR OF CAL INC. 2 (June 21, 2012).
116. Id.
117. After amending the poison pill to meet ISS's guidelines, the corporation
resubmitted it for ratification at its 2013 annual meeting. See Definitive Proxy Statement, PAC.
SUNWEAR OF CAL. INC. 25 (Apr. 26, 2013). ISS recommended in favor, and the proposal passed,





In circumstances where there has not yet been a charter amendment
proposed, we cannot be certain how an amendment would fare, or the effect of
the broker voting change on the likelihood of such an amendment. However,
we can be certain that a potential amendment would fail where, even if all of
the shareholders that voted had cast their votes in favor of the amendment,
those shareholders would still be insufficient to meet the voting requirement
necessary to amend the charter."8 This definition will underestimate the
number of frozen charters as defined above, as there may be some amendments
that would fail if they received 90% support, but would pass if they received
100% support. The frozen charter will be the result of the broker voting change
if, in addition to this criterion, shareholder turnout and uninstructed broker
votes are greater than the vote required.119
To determine the number of frozen charters among companies that have
not yet had charter amendment proposals, and whether those are caused by the
broker voting change, I gather proxies for shareholder turnout, uninstructed
broker votes, and voting requirements for each U.S. company in the Russell
3000 index. I determine applicable voting requirements from whether the
company has a supermajority provision to amend its charter or bylaws, and if
not, the default charter amendment requirement in its state of incorporation.
To estimate likely shareholder turnout and broker votes for a potential
charter amendment, I use voting in director elections. Since Rule 452 was
amended to prevent uninstructed broker voting on director elections in 2010,
corporations have been required to disclose broker vote/non-vote figures for
director elections.120
However, using these figures as estimators of turnout for a potential
charter amendment proposal presents two potential problems. Director election
turnout (and charter amendment urnout) may vary from year to year. I
therefore estimate the number of frozen charters in each year from 2010 to
2014. To be even more conservative, I also consider the number of frozen
charters assuming each company had their maximum turnout within that period
(and the corresponding number of uninstructed broker votes).
118. In other words: ato < areq. This is consistent with the analysis above, where I
used afo, < areq and Pfor > 0.9. Because atfo, =tto x I3for, so the first condition is a,, x Ifor < ttreq.
Since we are assuming 3for = 1, the first condition simplifies to ato < a,q. Similarly, assuming that
3for = 1, the second condition, [3for > 0.9, is always satisfied.
This assumes that the company has a "shares outstanding" standard to amend the relevant part of
its charter. Though since almost all "votes cast" standards require a majority of votes cast, if more
than 90% of votes cast are in favor of a proposal at such a company, the proposal will pass.
119. In other words: ato < areq and at, + bv > areq.
120. See Form 8-K Current Report, supra note 55. However, a number of
corporations nonetheless disclose zero broker non-votes. Where this is an inaccurate disclosure of
a positive number of broker non-votes, they will not be picked up by my method, which will
therefore produce an underestimate of the number of corporations affected by the broker voting
change.
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A second problem in estimating turnout may occur if there is
systematically higher turnout for meetings with votes involving charter
amendments than for meetings without charter amendment votes. Intuitively, it
makes sense that if a company has an amendment proposal on the ballot and is
concerned that the amendment may fail, management of the company may
employ a proxy solicitor to try to get a greater number of shareholders to vote. I
examine this possibility at length in Appendix C, and undertake a variety of
tests to determine if this is the case. My analysis shows that, between 2010 and
2014, director election turnout was not higher at annual meetings where
corporations also had corporate governance proposals on their ballot.
21
However, because there is intuitive and anecdotal evidence22 to suggest that
increases are possible (if not widespread), I also test the number of frozen
charters based on an arbitrary assumption that corporations are able to increase
turnout by 5%.
I limit my sample to companies that are currently in the Russell 3000
index.2 3 I exclude companies with missing turnout data. I exclude meetings
with contested elections, where shareholder votes may be split with competing
candidates. I eliminate companies where cumulative voting or multiple classes
of shares with different voting rights makes it difficult to estimate likely
shareholder amendment turnout.124 This leaves a sample of 11,288 company
years, or an average of 2,257.6 companies per year. My results are set out in
Table 2 below.
121. As described in Appendix C, having a corporate governance proposal on the
ballot was actually associated with lower director election turnout.
122. According to FactSet SharkRepellent, one corporation, Apache Corporation,
put forward management proposals in 2013, 2014, and 2015. The proposals in 2013 and 2014 had
turnout of 74.9% and 78.2%, respectively, insufficient to satisfy the company's 80%
supermajority requirement, even with more than 98% of votes cast in support each year. In 2015,
the proposal received 83.4% turnout and passed. This suggests that some corporations with frozen
charters can, through sustained effort, increase their turnout sufficiently to overcome frozen
charters. Apache Corporation increased its turnout by 4.5% from 2013 to 2014, and by 6.6% from
2014 to 2015, an average of 5.5%.
123. For a discussion of the composition of the Russell 3000 index, see supra
note 75 and accompanying text.
124. Although these companies are not identified as such in the SharkRepellent
database, I identify them as those where with significant variation in turnout among directors-




Table 2: Estimated Frozen Charters Resulting from
the Broker Voting Change (BVC)
Frozen
Frozen Charter
Year Total Charter 0 Because
Companies Because of of BVC
BVC with 5%
Inflation
2010 2,022 261 12.9% 254 12.6%
2011 2,155 302 14.0% 282 13.1%
2012 2,205 326 14.8% 282 12.8%
2013 2,310 312 13.5% 285 12.3%
2014 2,596 371 14.3% 353 13.6%
Max a0 2,619 256 9.8% 233 8.9%2010-14
I estimate that, based on yearly data from 2010 to 2014, between 13% and
15% of U.S. companies have frozen charters as a result of the broker voting
change. Even on the most conservative assumptions-using the maximum
turnout between 2010 and 2014, I estimate that about 10% of U.S. companies
have frozen charters as a result of the broker voting change. The possibility of
increasing turnout by 5% decreases the number of frozen charters caused by the
broker voting change by a very small amount-the proportion of companies
with frozen charters remains between 12.6% and 13.6% based on actual
numbers, or 8.9% assuming the maximum turnout between 2010 and 2014.
B. Shareholder-Unamendable Bylaws
I use the same methodology as in Section III.A to determine the number
of corporations where the broker voting change has made it impossible for
shareholders to amend the bylaws of the corporation.25 The default
requirement in most states for a bylaw amendment is only a majority of votes
cast,126 but a majority of companies provide for supermajority requirements for
shareholder votes to amend certain bylaw provisions.127 The FactSet
SharkRepellent database provides data regarding supermajority requirements
125. As before, I evaluate the number of companies where: ato < 0treq and ato + abv
> a,,q. In this instance I use 04,q to represent the vote required for the bylaw amendment, rather
than the charter amendment.
126. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
127. 1,087 companies in my sample (41.9%) have supermajority provisions for
amending one or more provisions of their bylaws.
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for bylaw amendment. However, the database does not differentiate between
corporations that require a majority of outstanding shares to amend certain
bylaw provisions, and those that require a majority of votes cast. To be
conservative, I assume that all companies without a supermajority require only
a majority of votes cast. As a result, my analysis is likely to significantly
underestimate the number of companies with board-only bylaw amendments.
Table 3 below sets out my results.28
Table 3: Bylaws Not Amendable by Shareholders as a Result of
the Broker Voting Change (BVC)
Bylaw Not
Year Total Companies Amendable ByShareholders
Because ofB VC
2010 2,022 173 8.6%
2011 2,155 193 9.0%
2012 2,205 209 9.5%
2013 2,310 192 8.3%
2014 2,596 239 9.2%
Max ao2
2010-14 2,619 162 6.2%
Table 3 shows that, based on 2010 to 2014 data, the broker voting change
has made it impossible for shareholders to amend the bylaws of between 8.3%
and 9.5% of U.S corporations, or 6.2% of U.S. corporations using the most
conservative estimate.
C. Insider Vetoes
As with frozen charters, it is possible to estimate the number of companies
where the broker voting change has given insiders a veto over certain charter
128. 1 do not include calculations based on a 5% inflation figure in Table 3 or
Table 4, as the inflation is predicated on the possibility that management would choose to employ
a proxy solicitor to increase turnout. In the situations described in Section I1.B and Section IlI.C,
I am assuming that management prefers not to amend the bylaws or charter; if they did, they could
bring a bylaw amendment themselves, or could refrain from exercising their veto over the
amendment. If management prefers not to amend the bylaws or charter, there would be no reason
for them to employ a proxy solicitor to increase turnout.
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amendments. Based on the same simplifying assumption that all shareholders
support a particular resolution,2 9 insiders will have a veto as a result of the
broker voting change where turnout is greater than the vote requirement, but
turnout less the insider block is less than the vote required, and turnout plus
broker votes less the insider vote would be greater than the vote required.130 I
use the same methodology and data as above, including insider holdings taken
from the FactSet SharkRepellent database. My results are shown in Table 4
below.
Table 4: Insider Veto As a Result of the Broker Voting Change (BVC)
Year Total Compani es Insider VetoBecause of B VC
2010 2,022 135 6.7%
2011 2,155 166 7.7%
2012 2,205 170 7.7%
2013 2,310 170 7.4%
2014 2,596 209 8.1%
Max a 0  2,619 196 7.5
2010-14
As shown in Table 4, I estimate that the broker voting change has resulted
in insiders at between 6.7% and 8.1% of U.S. companies having a potential
veto over charter amendments, or 7.5% of companies using the most
conservative assumptions. Of course, since shareholder support for a particular
resolution will be less than 100%,131 there will be a greater set of companies
where the broker voting change has given insiders a de facto veto over certain
amendments.
D. Distorted Passes
In the same way that I extended my consideration of frozen charters to the
large majority of companies that have not had charter amendments go to a vote,
it is possible to consider the likelihood of potential distorted passes for
proposals that have not yet been voted on.
129. Ifor = I.
130. If ain, represents the insider block, then: at > aeq and C6 - Ctis < Ctreq and a, -
Oins + obv > creq.
131. 1for<1.
Yale Journal on Regulation
I find that 370 companies (16.6%) could potentially have a distorted pass
result. However, these are only potentially distortable companies. To estimate
the likely number of distorted passes, it is necessary to consider the level of
support that would be necessary for the companies above to have votes
distorted, and the likelihood of those levels of support occurring. The level of
support necessary for the vote to be distorted will be a function of the number
of broker votes and the turnout for the vote. The lower the number of broker
votes as a proportion of the turnout, the closer the level of support must be to
0.5 for the outcome to be distorted.32 Table 5 below shows the distortable
companies by the range of support at which they could be distorted.
Table 5: Expected Number of Distorted Companies
Minimum Range of Likelihood Expected Number
Support for Companies Support for of Support of Distorted Pass
Distortion Distortion in Range Companies
45%-50% 244 45%-50% 0.4% 0.9
40%-45% 62 40%-50% 0.6% 0.4
35%-40% 30 35%-50% 0.9% 0.3
30%-35% 14 30%-50% 0.9% 0.1
20%-30% 8 20%-50% 0.9% 0.1
10%-20% 6 10%-50% 1.1% 0.1
0%-10% 6 0%-50% 1.1% 0.1
Total 370 1.8
Along with the breakdown of distortable companies by the minimum level
of support necessary for distortion, Table 5 also shows the likelihood of
proposal support being between that level and 0.5, based on the proportion of
all management proposals that received support in that range from 2012 to
2014. 33 By multiplying this likelihood by the number of companies requiring
132. For companies with outstanding shares requirements, rearranging the
formula above, we can see that:
,~or arq - abv
For companies with votes cast requirements:
flfor Oto
133. This assumes that the likelihood of that level of support is independent of
the "distortability" of the company submitting the proposal. In reality, companies that are
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that level of support, we can estimate the number of companies that are likely
to have a distorted pass outcome as a result of broker votes. As Table 5 shows,
only 1.8 companies, or 0.08% of the companies in my sample, can be expected
to have a distorted pass outcomes as a result of broker votes.
This result reflects the low number of management proposals that are
likely to receive less than 50% of shareholder support brought by directors.
However, if management were to begin bringing forward more unpopular
proposals, the number of potential distorted pass proposals would also change.
Since such a possibility cannot be ruled out, any solution to the problem of
distortion should minimize the risk of distorted passes as well as reducing the
incidence of distorted fails.
IV. Evaluating the Broker Voting Changes
I turn now to consider the broker voting change from a normative
perspective. I evaluate the broker voting change from several frames of
reference. First, consistent with its own goals, I consider the broker voting
change from an investor perspective. Second, I consider the broker voting
change from a firm value perspective. Third, I consider the broker voting
change from the perspective of the contractarian theory that underlies corporate
law. Fourth, I consider the broker voting change from the perspective of
directors and managers. I conclude with some words about the procedure by
which the broker voting change was put in place.
A. The Investor Perspective
Because the broker voting change is so short-about half a page of text-
it does not explicitly set out the reasons underlying its prohibition on
uninstructed broker voting for certain corporate governance proposals. Instead,
it references recent "changes in [NYSE] rules as well as through legislative
action," gives the example of the 2010 prohibition on broker voting of
uninstructed shares in the election of directors and executive compensation
matters, and indicates that the changes are being made "in light of these and
other recent congressional and public policy trends disfavoring broker voting of
uninstructed shares.'134 To understand the goals of the broker voting change, it
is therefore necessary to refer to the reasons underlying the 2010 changes
prohibiting uninstructed broker voting on director elections and executive
compensation. The underlying rationales cited in the SEC orders approving the
2010 prohibitions on uninstructed broker voting on director elections and
broker voting on executive compensation were to "better enfranchise
distortable may be slightly more likely to put forward proposals that have lower levels of support,
and therefore the estimates in Table 5 may underestimate the level of expected distortion, though
likely by less than an order of magnitude.
134. See Information Memorandum 12-4, supra note 60, at 1.
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shareholders"'' 35 and thereby "further investor protection and the public
interest"'136 and "enhance corporate governance and accountability to
shareholders.'37 I therefore consider first how the broker voting change fares
against its own implicit goal of investor protection.
Taking into account the consequences of the broker voting change
outlined in Parts 1I and III, how does the broker voting change fare when
evaluated against these aims? Here it is necessary to weigh the benefits of the
broker voting change for investors in eliminating distorted pass results, with its
costs to investors in causing distorted fail outcomes for proposals that investors
consider to be value enhancing. As Part II shows, the number of distorted fail
outcomes resulting from the broker voting change, particularly frozen charters,
clearly outweighs the small number of distorted pass results that the broker
voting change has prevented. And on a prospective basis, as described in Part
III, the number of companies that are likely to have frozen charters without
broker voting, and other distorted fail outcomes that likely resulted from the
elimination of broker voting, clearly outweigh the small number of companies
where permitting broker voting could result in distorted pass outcomes.138 By
freezing charters, the broker voting change has disenfranchised shareholders.
To the extent that these shareholders believe that charter amendments they vote
on would enhance corporate governance and accountability to shareholders, the
broker voting change has prevented such enhancement and accountability. As
Sections II.B and II.C illustrate, there are other additional ways in which, rather
than protecting shareholders from distortion in favor of insiders, the broker
voting change has actually harmed investors-by giving certain insiders veto
power over amendments that shareholders may believe to be in their interest,
and by taking away shareholders' ability to amend certain bylaws.
The most obvious counterargument in favor of the broker voting change is
that broker voting is empty voting; brokers do not have any economic interest
in the shares they vote, and therefore should not be controlling how those
shares are voted.139 However, this argument against broker voting is like the old
saw, variously attributed, that it might work in practice, but how does it work in
theory? Voting by an actor without an economic interest is problematic not
because it violates any established rule of corporate law. Indeed, many
investors vote through intermediaries such as investment advisers that may not
135. See 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,296.
136. See 2010 SEC Release, supra note 54, at 56,154.
137. See id. at 9; see also 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,296 n.34
(arguing also that the 2009 change to the broker voting rules would "enhance corporate
governance and accountability"). This is also consistent with statements made during interviews
by NYSE and SEC staff members at the time the broker voting change was adopted (interview
notes on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
138. This assumes that the distribution of support for corporate governance
proposals would remain constant.
139. Indeed, this argument was put forward in defense of the broker voting rule
change by a former SEC official in an interview with the author. See interview with former SEC
Official (on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
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have any economic interest in the shares that they are responsible for buying
and voting. Instead, exercising voting rights without having an economic
interest is considered undesirable because of the outcomes it is prone to
produce-the voting actor influencing outcomes in their own interest, rather
than the interests of their beneficiary.140 But-in contrast to voting on other
matters, like director elections and executive compensation -the nature of
voting on management proposals means that there are few, if any,
circumstances where there may be a potential divergence between brokers'
interests and the interests of the beneficial owners of the shares.
As outlined above, charter amendment votes differ in two important
respects from the director elections and executive compensation votes that the
broker voting change refers to. First, there is a greater possibility for a
divergence between director recommendations and shareholder preferences in
director elections or executive compensation votes than in charter amendments.
Second, the default rule for most charter amendments is not with reference to
votes cast, but to shares outstanding.'4' As was explained in Part I above, many
corporations have supermajority requirements requiring the approval of a
higher proportion of shares outstanding. With a votes cast standard, preventing
uninstructed broker voting will have a limited effect on the chance of the
proposal passing, as broker votes will be eliminated from both the numerator
and denominator of the proportion of votes cast. Indeed, Akyol, Raff, and
Verwijmeren found that the 2010 amendments to Rule 452 eliminating
uninstructed broker voting for director elections did not decrease approval rates
for directors.42 However, as demonstrated by the number of frozen charters
observed in Part II above, with a shares outstanding standard, preventing broker
voting will have a much greater impact on the likelihood of a proposal passing.
It was therefore inapposite to apply reasoning from recent changes to Rule 452
to uninstructed broker voting on corporate governance proposals.
B. The Firm Value Perspective
The consequences of the broker voting change have been to prevent
changes in the corporation's governance. Given that they garnered the support
of managers, directors, and shareholders, it is likely that these changes are
value-enhancing for the corporation and its shareholders.43 However, in a
140. See, e.g., The 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,296, (indicating that
the proposed rule "should better enfranchise shareholders by helping assure that votes ... are
determined by those with an economic interest in the company" (footnote omitted)).
141. This excludes those companies incorporated in states governed by MBCA-
based statutes that have not overridden the default amendment rule in those states, though as
discussed in Section Ill.A, these represent only 5% of the sample I consider.
142. See Ali C. Akyol et al., supra note 10, at 17 ("[W]e observe no decrease in
approval rates after the change in Rule 452. In fact, the increase in approval rates in annual
meetings after 2009 is statistically significant at the 1% level.").
143. Indeed, as directors arc required to declare that such proposals are in the
best interests of the company, and are bound by fiduciary duties, this is a strong presumption.
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number of these corporations, frozen charters have prevented the corporation
from making such amendments. To the extent this is the result of the broker
voting change, the rule change has prevented the maximization of firm value.
An argument could be made that charter amendments of the kind
prevented by frozen charters are not value enhancing, and that by preventing
them, the broker voting change has maximized firm value. Indeed, one side of
an active debate in corporate law and financial economics holds that removing
anti-takeover devices (as most charter amendments eek to do) reduces firm
value.14 However, that would imply that the directors that propose and
recommend the charter amendment as being in the best interests of the
corporation do so wrongly, in spite of their fiduciary duties. In Section III.D, I
speculate about how this could come to pass. However, such an argument
would also mean that the large majority of shareholders that vote for the charter
amendment as being in their own best interests are also mistaken, which seems
implausible.
C. The Contractarian Perspective
Another way to evaluate the broker voting change is from the perspective
of the contractarian view of corporate law. Economists and corporate law
scholars have long understood the corporation as a "nexus of contracts" among
different parties in the corporation.45 To the extent this analogy holds, the
corporate charter is the central part of that contract. The charter defines the key
terms of the contract among the corporation and its shareholders (which I will
refer to as the "corporate contract")-either by incorporating those terms
explicitly, or by remaining silent and therefore adopting the default terms set
out in state law. One of the crucial terms in the contract is the process for its
amendment. The corporate law of most states provides certain mandatory
requirements for charter amendments, although all states allow these to be
modified in certain ways in the charter. Charter terms do not explicitly deal
with broker voting. However, as the discussion in Part I indicates, the treatment
of broker voting is central to the results of shareholder approval votes, because
of its influence on the level of turnout, and because brokers overwhelmingly
vote in favor of management proposals. As a result, the term of the corporate
contract that deals with the requirements for shareholder approval of
144. See, e.g., Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm
Value, Revisited (Mar. 14, 2016), https://ssm.com/abstract=2364165 [https://perma.cc/QU8R-
LWMY]. For the contrary view, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched
Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and
Managerial Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. EcON. 501 (2007).
145. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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amendments is predicated on certain expectations about the treatment of broker
voting.
The amendment terms of the charters in almost all of the companies in my
sample were adopted prior to January 2012.146 These amendment terms were
predicated on uninstructed broker voting being permitted on charter
amendments. As discussed above, it was also generally understood that brokers
voted overwhelmingly in favor of management,'47 and that broker votes
represented, on average, about 10% of shares outstanding.48 The prohibition on
broker voting on charter amendments implicitly modifies the amendment
requirements of corporate charters from how they were understood by directors
and shareholders. To the extent this resulted in frozen charters, the expectation
of directors and shareholders that the charter could be amended given a certain
level of shareholder support has been thwarted.4 9 Thwarting the intention of
the corporate contract is value-reducing because it results in a move away from
contractual terms agreed to by all of the parties to the contractual nexus of the
corporation.50 As a result, it is likely that changing the terms of the contract
from those that were understood by the parties results in a less efficient
corporate contract.5 ' Even if the corporate contract were not completely
efficient, taking away the ability to amend the contract would make the contract
more efficient only in a very narrow and unlikely set of circumstances.1
5 2
146. Ten companies in my sample successfully amended their charters to reduce
or eliminate supermajority requirements for charter amendments at their 2012 annual meetings.
147. See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 14; Marcel Kahan &
Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REv. 1347, 1360 (2011) ("[T]he
broker can vote the uninstructed shares in its discretion-which usually means in accordance with
management recommendations.").
148. Bethel & Gillan, supra note 44, at 42.
149. The significance of this point is diminished by many other changes to the
factors that influence the difficulty of amending corporate charters since those charters were
entered into-for instance, the rise of institutional investors. However many such changes are
endogenous to the shareholders or the corporation, whereas the broker voting change is
exogenous.
150. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 145.
151. A long-standing debate in corporate law concerns whether the initial
corporate contract is efficient. Corporate contracts are understood to be efficient because the
parties designing the corporate contract cannot benefit from introducing inefficient terms, because
the other parties are informed of their value, and will price the inefficient term accordingly.
Therefore, the parties to the initial charter will draft value-maximizing terms. If the corporate
contract is efficient, then any unintended change to the corporate contract-such as a change in
the effect of the amendment term-will make the contract less efficient.
152. Having the option to amend the contract is likely to be efficient. Evidence
for the efficiency of amendment can be found in the fact that public company charters could
effectively prevent amendments by requiring 100% unanimity; however, only one company in my
sample implemented this requirement. In order for a charter preventing amendment o be efficient,
shareholders would have to believe that there is some benefit to preventing themselves from
amending the charter, and that that benefit would outweigh the cost of preventing current or future
amendments to the charter. Of course, despite these beliefs, shareholders could not have already
taken the efficient action to prevent future amendments. In any other set of circumstances,
changing the amendment erm to prevent amendment will reduce the value of the company.
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D. Directors' and Managers' Perspective
Throughout this Article I have assumed that, because charter amendments
require the approval of directors, directors (and managers) support such charter
amendments. However, there may be reasons to believe that directors and
managers prefer that certain amendments fail, notwithstanding their approval of
the amendments. There are a small number of management proposals where
directors have not given a recommendation either for or against the proposal, or
have recommended against the proposal. Table 6 below sets out the number of
such recommendations for charter and bylaw amendments from 2005 to 2013.
Table 6: Number of "No Recommendation" and "Against" Recommendations
by Type of Management Proposal, 2005-13
No "Against'"
Recommendation Recommendation All Proposals
Charter
Amendments'53  7 2 1,826
Bylaw Amendments 2 4 359
Other 8 1 260
Total 17 7 2,445
Although there are very few instances where directors do not recommend
in favor of a management proposal,54 there are a large number of situations
where management proposals approved by directors were preceded at the
previous annual meeting by shareholder proposals that directors recommended
against, and put forward numerous arguments against, casting doubt that the
directors' approvals and recommendations of a management proposal signal
their true preferences. The most explicit example of directors bringing a
proposal they do not personally support occurred at the 2013 annual meeting of
Costco Wholesale Corporation. The board of directors approved a management
proposal to declassify the board,55 but the board made no recommendation
153. These include amendments of both charter and bylaws.
154. One reason there may be so few instances where directors make no
recommendation or recommend against a proposal is because failing to recommend the proposal
may cast doubt on whether the directors believe the proposal is in the best interests of the
company, and therefore whether their decision to approve the proposal was consistent with their
fiduciary duties.
155. The management proposal followed a shareholder proposal put forward by
the Pension Reserves Investment Management Board, which was represented by the Shareholder
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about the proposal, and stated that "each director has advised the Company that
as a shareholder he or she intends to vote AGAINST the proposal."'
' 56
Why might directors approve amendments that they personally disfavor?
This may be the case if a precatory shareholder proposal requesting the
amendment has previously been approved by the shareholders of the company.
The voting guidelines of many institutional investors indicate that, if that is the
case, they will withhold votes from directors that fail to implement the request
contained in the shareholder proposal.57 Similarly, the policies of the major
proxy advisory firms are to recommend withhold votes against directors that
fail to implement the request contained in a successful shareholder proposal.
58
Directors wishing to avoid having a significant proportion of votes withheld in
their own elections may therefore comply with shareholder wishes that an
amendment be put forward, even though they personally oppose the
amendment.
This is most likely to be the case for potential charter amendments, where
directors' (and managers') preferences regarding amendments diverge from the
preferences of the substantial majority of shareholders, such as charter
amendments to remove anti-takeover measures like classified boards. In these
cases, it is possible that shareholders may prefer to amend the charter to remove
such anti-takeover defenses, based on the belief that the threat of a takeover
may encourage management o perform more effectively, and shareholders may
benefit from the potential premium paid in the case of a takeover.
Consequently, shareholder proposals put forward in 2014 requesting that
companies remove classified boards, a key takeover defense, received average
support of 81% of votes cast.59 However, managers may prefer not to amend
the charter to remove anti-takeover provisions, for corresponding reasons - the
Rights Project. See Proposals for the 2013 Proxy Season (2013), SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT,
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/2013-declassification-proposals.shtml.
156. Definitive Proxy Statement, COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP. 27 (Dec. 17, 2013)
(emphasis in original). Costco Wholesale Corporation is a Washington corporation. Its actions are
unlikely to be permissible in other states. For example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1)
requires that the board of directors adopt a resolution "declaring [the] advisability" of a charter
amendment.
157. See, e.g., State Street Global Advisors, 3 PROXY VOTING AND
ENGAGEMENT GUIDELINES (Mar. 2015), http://www.ssga.com/investment-topies/environmental-
social-governance/2015/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-Guidelines-United-States.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QMZ8-QZ68] ("SSGA may withhold votes from directors based on the
following: . . . Directors of companies that have ignored a shareholder proposal which received a
majority of the shares outstanding at the last annual or special meeting, unless management
submits the proposal(s) on the ballot as a binding management proposal, recommending
shareholders vote for the particular proposal(s) ....").
158. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDERS SERVS. INC., U.S. SUMMARY PROXY
VOTING GUIDELINES 15 (2016), http://www.issgovemance.com/file/policy/2016-us-summary-
voting-guidelines-dec-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CVC-VHZZ] (indicating that ISS will generally
vote for board nominees, except, inter alia, that it will "[v]ote case-by-case on individual
directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if: . . . [t]he board
failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in
the previous year.").
159. See GEORGESON, supra note 91, at 20.
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threat of a takeover that might lead to their replacement will reduce their job
security, and put more pressure on them to perform than they may otherwise
prefer.6 °
V. Fixing Frozen Charters
In this Part, I consider how the problems described above may be
mitigated. I consider four kinds of solutions. Most obviously, the changes in the
broker voting change could be reversed. Alternatively, steps could be taken to
reduce the level of uninstructed broker votes. If uninstructed broker votes
cannot be eliminated, a proportional system of voting could be implemented, or
a system could be devised to permit uninstructed broker voting in particular
circumstances. I conclude with some comments on the procedure by which any
reform should be undertaken.
I evaluate each of the solutions presented below against the goals inherent
in the framework developed in Section II.A above: to reduce both distorted fail
proposals and distorted pass proposals. As discussed in Section II.C above,
there were only a small number of management proposals that received low
levels of shareholder support from 2012 to 2014, which limited the positive
impact of eliminating distorted pass proposals during that period .161 However, it
is not possible to conclude that this distribution of shareholder support is the
natural state of the world. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of circumstances
where a much larger number of proposals might receive low shareholder
support.62 For the reasons set out in Section II.C, it seems unlikely that
directors of a significant number of companies would bring proposals that had a
significant chance of failing. However, since the possibility cannot be ruled out,
any solution to the problem of distortion should minimize the risk of distorted
passes as well as reducing the incidence of distorted fails. The ideal solution
would therefore undo the effects of the broker voting change in freezing
corporate charters163 (as well as other "distorted fails" for bylaw amendments,
and insider vetoes), while maintaining the potential benefits of the broker
160. Although this might prompt the question of whether such managers, or
others acting with their interests in mind, were instrumental in bringing about the broker voting
change, interviews with NYSE and SEC staff who were in relevant positions at the time the broker
voting change was implemented suggest that this is not the case, and that the result was an
unintended consequence, albeit one that such managers may not disfavor (interview notes on file
with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
161. See supra Section II.C.
162. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, a significant number of
companies amended their charters to put in place takeover defenses, such as staggered boards.
These types of amendments may have received significantly lower levels of shareholders support.
163. There are a number of companies that have frozen charters that are not the
result of the broker voting change. Because of high supermajority requirements and/or low
shareholder turnout, these companies would have frozen charters even if broker voting were
permitted. Remedying frozen charters in these cases would require some other kind of




voting change in reducing distorted passes. I also comment on the potential cost
and workability of the solutions.
Before discussing potential systemic solutions to the problem created by
the broker voting change, it is worth discussing solutions that individual
companies can implement. Most obviously, as discussed in Section III.A, a
corporation could use the services of a proxy solicitor to increase its turnout.
This option, including its limitations, is discussed in Section V.B. A company
with a frozen charter generally cannot reduce the voting requirements for
amending the charter, as such requirements themselves are generally also
subject to the same voting requirements. There are also two theoretically
possible but practically far-fetched solutions: disregarding the charter
165
provision64 and undertaking a merger to remove the charter provision.
Though they are unlikely to be plausible solutions for large public corporations,
I mention them for completeness.
164. A company could disregard the voting requirement provision in its charter,
and seek judicial validation either in advance or after the fact. A similar process occurred at
Baxter International Inc. The corporation had tried in 2006, 2011, 2012, and 2013 to amend its
charter to declassify its board of directors (two of these proposals followed engagement with the
Nathan Cummings Foundation, which was represented by the Shareholder Rights Project). Each
attempt failed because of a provision in the corporation's charter that required approval of "at least
two-thirds of the holders of all the securities of the Corporation then entitled to vote on such
change" to amend the declassification provision. See AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF
INCORPORATION, FILED As EXHIBIT 3.1 TO CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K), at 8 (2013). In 2014,
the Delaware Court of Chancery found (and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed) that a very
similarly worded voting agreement provision was ambiguous and should be treated as providing
for a per-share scheme. Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354 (Del. 2014). Pursuant to an agreement
with an activist investor, Third Point Advisors, Baxter brought an application in the Court of
Chancery to validate its treatment of its voting provision as a per-share scheme. However, the
Court of Chancery denied Baxter's motion since the provision had not been put to a vote. See
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC. 62-63 (Mar. 24,
2016). After the charter amendment was approved at the corporation's 2016 annual meeting on a
per-share basis, the Court of Chancery validated the treatment and the amendment. In re Baxter
Int'l Inc., C.A. No. 11609-CB (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 2016). However, while this makes clear that
judicial approval of a voting provision is possible if the provision is ambiguous, it is not clear that
a court would overrule an unambiguous supermajority vote requirement.
165. A corporation could theoretically undertake a merger into a wholly-owned
subsidiary specially created for that purpose, and stipulate that the charter of the other corporation
become the charter of the surviving corporation. The charter of the other corporation could be set
up as identical to the charter of the existing corporation, but with a lower voting requirement for
charter amendments. This assumes either that the voting requirement for stockholder votes to
approve mergers is lower than that to amend the charter, or that a merger vote would have a higher
shareholder turnout. This may have unforeseen consequences for the corporation's contractual
relationships--e.g., triggering "change of control" provisions in contracts. In addition, it would
involve substantial transaction costs for the corporation, including the preparation of merger
documents and holding a shareholder vote. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c). Although
state corporations laws provide for short-form mergers into wholly-owned subsidiaries of a
constituent corporation, such that a vote of shareholders of a constituent corporation would not be
required-for example, see id. § 251 (g)-that procedure only applies if there are no changes to the
certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation, which would not be the case here. In
2013, a new provision, id § 25 1(h), was added to the Delaware Code allowing a merger without a
vote of constituent corporation shareholders. However, that provision only operates when a
corporation has made a tender offer for all of the shares of the constituent corporation, and as a
result thereof, owns at least 50% of the shares of the constituent corporation, which is very
unlikely.
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A. Reversing the Broker Voting Change
The most obvious solution to the problems outlined in Parts II and III is to
reverse the broker voting change. This would have the converse consequences
to those described in Parts II and III above. The distorted pass results caused by
the broker voting change would disappear: the frozen charters caused by the
broker voting change and bylaws made amendable only by the board would
once again be amendable by shareholder vote, and the number of insider vetoes
would be reduced. However, the possibility of distorted fail proposals would be
reinstated. As discussed above, given the current practice of corporations,
whereby very few bring management proposals that are likely to receive less
than a majority of votes cast, the benefit from eliminating those frozen charters
and other distorted fail proposals outweigh the very few instances of distorted
pass proposals that might occur. However, there remains the possibility that the
number of distorted pass proposals could increase, especially given that the
reinstated potential for distortion from broker votes could increase the
likelihood of such proposals passing. One solution could be to continue to
require the disclosure of the number of uninstructed broker votes being voted,
so that their distortive effect could be observed, and appropriate steps taken if
distorted pass results became a significant problem.
Furthermore, reversing the broker voting change could be done
inexpensively, through the NYSE's issuance of further guidance reinstating
charter amendments to the status of "brokers may vote," thereby allowing
brokers the discretion to vote without authority from beneficial owners. Given
the simplicity of this solution and the ease by which it could be implemented,
the broker voting change could be reversed as an interim measure to reduce
harm to shareholders during the lengthy time period that may be required for
comprehensive reforms to be designed, debated, and implemented.
B. Reducing Uninstructed Broker Votes
An alternative solution to the problem of distortive broker votes would be
to reduce or eliminate uninstructed broker votes. If uninstructed broker votes
could be eliminated, this would obviate the need to choose between distorted
fails and distorted passes; both would be eliminated. Even if uninstructed
broker votes could only be reduced and not eliminated entirely, this would still
reduce the intensity of both kinds of distortions, and therefore the likelihood
that either would affect voting outcomes.
The number of uninstructed broker votes could be reduced in a number of
ways, some of which could be implemented by corporations, others of which
could be implemented by brokers. As discussed in Part I, most uninstructed
shares held through brokers are beneficially owned by retail investors.
Corporations can already take steps to increase the response level from retail
shareholders. Response rates among retail investors are higher when
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corporations mail proxy materials in full paper format, rather than electronic
notification, or the "notice and access" methods permitted by the SEC.66 In
addition, corporations can hire proxy solicitors to telephone individual retail
investors to encourage them to vote.
Presumably by using such techniques, a small number of the corporations
that had charter amendments fail have since been able to increase their turnout
sufficiently for similar charter amendments to pass. Apache Corporation put
forward a management proposal to declassify its board of directors at its 2013
annual meeting.67 Despite receiving 99% of votes cast, the proposal received
votes from only 74% of shares outstanding, below the corporation's 80%
supermajority amendment requirement, and failed.168 Apache Corporation put
forward a second declassification proposal in at its 2014 meeting,'69 and
received votes from 77% of shares outstanding yet again failing the
supermajority requirement.17 Finally, in 2015, a declassification proposal put
forward by the company'17 passed, receiving votes from 83% of shares
outstanding .172 Three other corporations- Capital One Financial Corporation,
Chesapeake Energy Corporation, and NCR Corporation-have been able to
pass amendments that previously failed.
However, repeated attempts at passing amendments are not always
successful - Teradata Corporation, whose attempted amendment was described
in Part II, subsequently tried
173 and failed a second time to amend its charter.
174
Proxy solicitations to significantly increase turnout are also likely to be
expensive. Most proxy solicitors charge a flat fee (e.g., $15,500 in the case of
Teradata's solicitation in 2014), 75 plus out of pocket expenses. The magnitude
of these expenses is not disclosed in the proxy statement, but these are
generally several dollars per shareholder contacted, with potential fees of
several dollars more if the shareholder actually votes.176 As a result, soliciting
166. See BROADRIDGE & PwC PROXYPULSE: How WELL Do YOU KNOW YOUR
SHAREHOLDERS? (2013), http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-PwC-ProxyPulse-
First-Edition.pdf [http://perma.cc/82SP-9GAQ] (noting that only about 17% of retail shares
receiving a notice were voted from 2007 to 2012, compared to 
36 % of shares receiving a full
paper package).
167. See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), APACHE CORP. 82 (Apr. 3,
2013).
168. See Current Report (Form 8-K), APACHE CORP. 4 (May 17, 2013).
169. See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), APACHE CORP. 76 (Apr. 2,
2014).
170. See Current Report (Form 8-K), APACHE CORP. 2 (May 19, 2014).
171. See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), APACHE CORP. 55 (Apr. 2,
2015).
172. See Current Report (Form 8-K), APACHE CORP. 3 (May 20, 2015).
173. See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), TERADATA CORP. 52 (Mar.
6,2014).
174. See Current Report (Form 8-K), TERADATA CORP. 3 (May 5, 2014).
175. See TERADATA CORP., supra note 173, at 58.
176. See, e.g., Proxy Solicitation Agreement Between Northwest Bancorp Inc.
and Laurel Hill Group, LLC, filed as Exhibit 99.8 to Northwest Bancshares, Inc., Pre-Effective
Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Oct. 26, 2009) (stipulating telephone
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voting instructions from a large number of shareholders that do not instruct
their brokers on how to vote can quickly become expensive. Even if increasing
turnout were successful and cost effective for a particular corporation, to solve
the general problem caused by the broker voting changes, it would need to be
undertaken in every corporation suffering from a frozen charter, at considerable
time and expense across the affected corporations.
A more permanent solution could be to reduce the number of retail
investors. Many corporations have buyback programs targeted at small lots of
shares. However, this requires retail investors to choose to tender into the
buyback, which is unlikely to be universal. Other transactions could
compulsorily acquire small shareholdings. In a reverse stock split, a corporation
reduces the number of its outstanding shares by combining shares in a
particular ratio. If a corporation undertook a reverse stock split with a high
ratio, for example, requiring that 100 old shares be exchanged for 1 new share
(a "l-for-100" reverse split), those shareholders with lots smaller than the ratio
would receive cash for their shares. However, this is likely to be a drastic and
expensive undertaking for a corporation, and since it will affect the number of
shares outstanding, may have undesired effects on the liquidity of the company.
Its costs are therefore likely to outweigh the benefits in reducing the number of
small shareholders.
An alternative solution from those implemented by corporations with
respect to their shareholders is for brokers to implement a solution with respect
to their clients. The most promising solution is client-directed voting."'
Brokers could require their clients to direct how their shares should be voted if
they fail to give instructions for a particular meeting. For example, clients could
instruct that their shares be voted as management recommends or against
management's recommendation. Alternatively, clients could request that their
shares be voted proportionally (as further discussed below). To the extent that
this could be implemented when clients establish a relationship with a broker, it
could significantly reduce the number of uninstructed broker shares. However,
there would inevitably be some brokers that do not choose to participate. In
rates "of $3.40 per actual contact and $1.00 for leaving a message after three attempts. For those
shareholders making use of the Quick Vote system, there will be an additional $3.00 tabulator
charge per vote taken.").
177. Client directed voting was discussed in the August 27, 2007 Addendum to
the Report and Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange
4 (June 5, 2006) [hereinafter Proxy Working Group Addendum]. For further discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of client directed voting, see Frank G. Zarb & John Endean,
Restoring Balance in Proxy Voting: The Case for "Client Directed Voting, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 14, 2010)
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/02/14/restoring-balance-in-proxy-voting-the-case-for-client-
directed-voting/ [http://perma.cc/4Q86-5LT7]; John Wilcox, Fixing the Problems with Client
Directed Voting, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CoRP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 5, 2010)
[http://perma.cc/XY9H-LS6H]; and James McRitchie, An Open Proposal for Client Directed





addition, it may be difficult for brokers to require existing clients to decide on a
voting option, or to force a default election upon existing clients. It is also
likely that one of the options for clients under a client-directed voting system
would be to choose that their shares not be voted if uninstructed; to the extent
clients choose this option, there would be no reduction in distorted fail results.
Although several of these solutions-especially client directed voting-
show promise, all could only be partially effective-none can completely
eliminate uninstructed shares, and therefore the problems of distorted pass
results and distorted fail results must be dealt with in another manner.
C. Proportional Voting
An alternative approach to broker voting considered by the Proxy
Working Group17 8 (and advocated by several commenters on the proposal to
limit uninstructed broker voting on director elections)179 is proportional voting.
This would replace the current structure whereby brokers can either vote all of
the shares they hold or none of the shares they hold depending on the matter,
with a system whereby brokers would be required to vote in proportion to the
votes of other shareholders. For instance, if 95% of other shareholders voted in
favor of a proposal, brokers would vote 95% of their shares in favor of the
proposal and 5% of their shares against the proposal.
Assuming that the preferences of shareholders holding their shares
through brokers are the same as other shareholders, this solution would
eliminate any distortion in shareholder voting. Consequently, it would avoid
both of the types of distorted outcomes discussed above. Assuming continued
high levels of shareholder support for management proposals, proportional
voting would undo the frozen charters caused by the broker voting change, as
well as the other kinds of distorted fail proposals, failed bylaw amendments and
insider vetoes. Since broker votes would follow the votes of other shareholders,
proportional voting would also avoid any distorted fail outcomes. Proportional
voting would also obviate the need for an arbitrary list of matters on which
brokers could or could not vote, such as that contained in the supplementary
materials to Rule 452-instead brokers would vote proportionally on all
matters.
However, proportional voting would be complicated to implement.' °
Brokers would need to obtain a measure of the proportion in which they vote
their shares. There are two separate reference groups by which the appropriate
proportion could be measured-the other shareholders of the corporation as a
whole, or other shareholders that have instructed a particular broker to vote.
178. See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 16-18.
179. See 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,301.
180. While the Proxy Working Group noted that it was "somewhat attractive, it
ultimately concluded that "in many ways proportional voting creates its own set of problems" and
that "it was not the optimum result." See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 17-18.
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The most obvious proportion for brokers to vote would be the proportion
of votes cast by all other (non-broker) shareholders of the corporation. This
would most accurately reflect overall shareholder preferences. However, if the
preferences of shareholders as a whole were different from those shareholders
who do not vote, this could result in distortions of its own. Logistically, basing
proportional voting on the aggregate proportion of votes cast would require a
tabulation of the shares of all of the other shareholders prior to the broker
submitting their proxies.181 Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. handles the
overwhelming majority of proxy statement distribution and vote handling for
most corporations. Broadridge could provide preliminary vote counts to the
corporation for distribution to brokers, or to brokers directly. In order for
proxies to be voted by brokers, this information would need to be received
several days before votes were due. This problem has been overcome with
respect to broker-by-broker proportional voting (described below), and
although coordinating vote tallies from multiple sources would be more
difficult, this is likely to be surmountable.
An alternative would be for brokers to give proxies to the proxy holders to
vote their shares in a proportion to be determined. Most proxy cards in
uncontested elections appoint selected officers or directors of the corporation as
the proxy holder, and direct the proxy holder to vote in the manner specified on
the proxy card. To implement proportional voting, the proxy card could include
an option of having the proxy holder split the shares in the proportion voted by
other shareholders.82 Such a system could be most easily implemented by SEC
regulation. While it could also conceivably be implemented by private
ordering, on a company-by-company basis, such a solution would have
significant limitations. Each company would have to act individually, thereby
duplicating significant effort, and requiring a very long lead time for the change
to be adopted by a substantial number of companies, if at all; it is also likely
that many companies would not implement the system.83 If such a system were
to be feasibly implemented in an efficient manner, SEC regulation would
therefore be required.
The alternative to voting on an aggregate basis would be for brokers to
vote uninstructed shares according to voting proportions obtained on a broker-
by-broker basis, from the instructions each broker receives from beneficial
owners that do submit such voting instructions. A broker-by-broker system
would be straightforward to implement. The brokers, or Broadridge acting on
their behalf, could tally the instructions they received from their other
181. It may also be possible for brokers to submit a blank proxy to the tabulating
organization or to directors, allowing them to vote the uninstructed shares in the proportion that is
later established.
182. Most proxy cards already indicate that the proxy will be voted in a particular
way if no direction is made on a proxy card with respect to a particular vote, usually following
directors' recommendations.
183. For a broader discussion of the relative merits of regulatory and private
ordering solutions, see Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 91.
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beneficial owners, and then split the proxies of the uninstructed shares in the
same proportions. As above, the tabulation would need to be done several days
prior to the votes being cast. However, as discussed in Part I above, beneficial
owners holding their shares through brokers are already required to notify the
broker of their votes at least ten days before the meeting.184 As a result, the
timing issue is unlikely to be a problem. Indeed, the Proxy Working Group
noted that one broker, Charles Schwab, had implemented proportional voting as
early as 2005.185 Following the release of the Proxy Working Group's report,
the Securities and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) issued a "best
practices" memorandum recommending that their member brokers implement
proportional voting of uninstructed shares in proportion to the votes cast by the
retail clients of the broker.1 86 According to news reports, four large brokers-
Charles Schwab, Ameritrade, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman
Sachs-adopted broker-by-broker proportional voting.'87 In a presentation to
SIFMA in 2007, Richard Daly, chief executive officer of Broadridge, outlined
how they provided proportional voting services to "four large broker clients" in
2007.188 The proportion was established based on shares voted by retail
customers of the broker. The proportion was calculated as of two days prior to
the meeting, and then recalculated the day before the meeting and the day of
the meeting, in order to account for newly voted shares.
Although a broker-by-broker system could be easily implemented, it
might result in other distortions where only a small number of street-name
holders submit instructions to a particular broker and those holders have
different preferences from other shareholders. The votes of the shareholders
that do vote would be "overweighted" to the extent of the uninstructed shares.
The larger the ratio of uninstructed shares to the shares being used to determine
the proportion, the stronger this effect. The Proxy Working Group considered
there to be a possibility of manipulation where a broker has a
disproportionately large number of uninstructed shares.'89 However, the
concerns expressed by the Proxy Working Group seem to have been assuaged
where the pool of votes used to set the proportion included only retail
investors.'90 Henry Hu and Bernard Black also consider this approach, and
184. See N.Y. STOCK. EXCH. INC., supra note 3, at R. 451 (b)(1).
185. See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 43, at 17.
186. See Proxy Working Group Addendum, supra note 177, at 4.
187. See Cyrus Sanati, A Surprise at the Ballot This Proxy Season?, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK BLOG (Feb. 25, 2009, 1:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/a-surprise-
at-the-ballot-this-proxy-season/ [http://perma.cc/85YY-7XWY].
188. See Slides from presentation by Richard J. Daly, Chief Exec. Officer,
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., to SIFMA Operations Conference (Apr. 29-May 2, 2007).
189. See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 17.
190. See Proxy Working Group Addendum, supra note 177, at 4 ("By limiting
the vote to be considered in making proportional voting decisions to the retail vote, the Proxy
Working Group thought that the potential for manipulation could be significantly reduced.").
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conclude that there is no reason to believe that the distortion would be
problematic.191
A potential argument against a proportional voting solution is that the
preferences of shareholders that do not vote may not match the preferences of
those that do vote, whether that proportion is taken on an aggregate basis or on
a broker-by-broker basis. Most clearly, shareholders holding through brokers
that do not vote (which are assumed to be retail investors) will differ from the
majority of holders of outstanding shares (which are large institutions). To a
lesser extent, shareholders holding through a certain broker that do vote may
differ from those that hold through that same broker that do not. However, it is
not clear that these differences will be substantial. Based on a rational actor
model of voting, the main difference between shareholders that vote and
shareholders that do not vote is that shareholders that vote have informed
themselves about the proposal and the outcome that is likely to maximize value
for them. The underlying interest of shareholders that do not vote is the same-
to maximize the value of their shares. Aside from random variation, there is no
reason to believe that if non-voting shareholders informed themselves about the
proposal, their preferences would differ from that of shareholders that do vote.
It is especially unlikely that shareholders would come to differing conclusions
where significant majorities of shareholders are in favor of a proposal-as is
the case with frozen charters by definition-and where directors and
shareholders agree on the value of the proposal.
It is clear that the logistical issues involved in a proportional voting
system are surmountable, whether through regulatory action, or through private
ordering by corporations or brokers. This would speak in favor of re-allowing
uninstructed broker voting, though encouraging a move towards proportional
voting.
D. Broker Voting on Certain Charter Amendments
A fourth set of alternatives would be to replace the broker voting change
with a rule that permits broker voting on a circumscribed set of corporate
governance proposals. Although this would not eliminate distortions from
broker voting in the same way as proportional voting, it would minimize the
harm from such distortions.
Allowing broker voting in any form will open up potential "empty voting"
counterarguments of the kind discussed in Section IV.A, that brokers do not
have an economic interest in the shares they are voting. However, for the
reasons outlined in that Section, this is unlikely to be a significant problem in
191. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and
Empty Voting 11: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 625, 705-06 (2008) ("This
would somewhat overweight the instructions that shareholders convey, but creates no obvious
incentive problems. At the margin, the prospect of overweighted voting might induce more
economic owners to vote.").
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practice. Similarly, to the extent that the preferences of the shareholders who do
not vote differ from those that do, broker voting that is guided by past
shareholder votes (including that described in Section V.D.2 below), will be a
distortion of shareholders' aggregate preferences, similar to that discussed in
Section V.C above with respect to proportional voting. However, as discussed,
there are reasons to believe that this may not be a significant problem in
practice.
The set of corporate governance proposals where broker voting would be
allowed would be those with the greatest likelihood of distorted fail outcomes
and the least likelihood of distorted pass outcomes. Such a rule could be
implemented by an addition to the supplementary materials to Rule 452,
indicating that a broker could not vote an uninstructed proxy on a corporate
governance matter such as the kinds listed in the broker voting change, unless
the proposal met certain conditions. One version of this approach, described in
Section V.D.2 below, was considered by NYSE and SEC officials as an
alternative to the broker voting change.92 I consider three possible alternatives
for what kind of proposals would be permitted.
1. Broker Voting for Removing Supermajorities
One set of corporate governance proposals where broker voting could be
permitted is charter or bylaw amendments to remove supermajority provisions.
Most frozen charters occur in companies with high supermajority
requirements.193 However, most supermajority requirements cannot be
removed, because they are themselves subject to supermajority requirements
for amendment. Therefore, charter amendments to remove them are also likely
to suffer distorted fails if broker voting is not permitted. Allowing broker votes
on amendments removing supermajorities would allow the circularity problem
to be broken. There are currently high levels of shareholder support for
removing supermajority provisions,9 4 so it is unlikely that such a proposal
would have the possibility of a distorted pass result.
Allowing broker voting on amendments to remove supermajority
provisions envisages a two-step process for amendment of other charter
provisions: the charter would be amended to remove the supermajority
provision, then the substantive provision could be amended at a subsequent
meeting. Not only would this take several years, but also such a private
192. Interview with NYSE and SEC officials (on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation).
193. This is unsurprising. In companies without supermajorities, if a proposal is
overwhelmingly supported, then the possibility of 10-15% of shares being uninstructed broker
shares and not vote is unlikely to reduce the overall vote below 50%.
194. Charter amendments to remove supermajority provisions received average
of 65% of votes cast in 2014. See GEORGESON, supra note 91, at 20.
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ordering solution would require each affected company to go through this
process and would therefore be more duplicative than a regulatory solution.
2. Broker Voting for Proposals that Shareholders Generally Support
Permitting brokers to vote only on matters that generally receive
substantial shareholder support target the kinds of proposals where frozen
charters and other distorted fail outcomes are most likely to be an issue, while
minimizing the risk of potential distortion. The possibility of a distorted fail
outcome would be eliminated, and since the proposal receives majority support,
a distorted pass outcome is also not possible.
One difficulty with this solution would lie in choosing a bright line rule
for those corporate governance proposals on which broker voting would be
permitted. One alternative would be to set out a list of topics that generally
receive strong shareholder support in the supplementary materials to Rule 452,
and allow broker discretionary voting on those proposals. This approach was
considered by NYSE and SEC officials as an alternative to the broker voting
change.'95 However, this approach would not reflect variances in voting
outcomes across firms and across time, and would likely need to be updated on
a regular basis through the lengthy SEC rulemaking procedure.
A better alternative would be to permit broker voting on a proposal that
previously received a strong majority (e.g., greater than 80% of votes cast) at a
previous annual meeting of the company. Similar to the approach in Section
V.D.1 above, this would require a two-step process to amend the charter.'
96
This approach would also reflect the general practice of many corporations,
which may wait for a successful shareholder proposal to demonstrate the
preferences of the company's shareholders before putting forward a
management charter amendment proposal on a particular topic.'97
3. Broker Voting Where a Supermajority Is Required
A third set of corporate governance resolutions on which broker voting
could be allowed are those amendments for which a supermajority vote is
required. This would be a broader set of amendments than that described in
195. Interviews with NYSE and SEC officials (on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation).
196. The two steps consist of: a vote to demonstrate sufficient support at the first
meeting, and then an actual amendment vote at the second meeting, which would likely take place
the following year. In contrast to the approach in Section V.D.1 above, the first proposal could be
submitted by a shareholder, whereas a supermajority amendment proposal would have to be put
forward by the board of directors.
197. See, e.g., Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33
DEL. J. CORP. L. 149 (2008).
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Section V.D.1 above.'98 As discussed in Section V.D.1 above, proposals that
require a supermajority for amendment are the very proposals that are likely to
result in frozen charters and other distorted fail proposals. They are also
proposals where there is almost no likelihood of a distorted pass outcome, since
significant support for the proposal would be required for it to pass. Permitting
brokers to vote only where a supermajority of outstanding shares is required
would therefore reduce frozen charters and other distorted fail outcomes, while
minimizing potential distorted pass outcomes. An addition to the
supplementary materials permitting broker voting on such proposals could also
be drafted in a straightforward manner, without ambiguity.
E. Procedure of Reform
As discussed in Section IV.E above, because the broker voting change
was not a formal amendment to Rule 452, it avoided the considered process
required for reviewing and approving such rule changes. Similarly, it could
easily be undone by a similar information memorandum amending the NYSE
policy on the matter.99 However, there may be reasons to believe that the
NYSE will not wish to take action on the matter without going through the SEC
rulemaking procedure .200 The most practical approach would therefore be for
the NYSE to work with the SEC on developing a new policy for the treatment
of broker votes on corporate governance proposals, and to submit that policy to
the SEC for approval through the rule-making process described in
Section IV.E above.2 °'
198. This would also encompass all amendments with supcrmajority provisions
that were themselves subject to supermajority approval requirements, thereby encapsulating the
set of proposals discussed in Section V.D. 1, above.
199. It is possible that the NYSE may face pressure from directors or managers
of some of the issuers listed on the exchange not to alter the broker voting change. As discussed in
Section IV.D, it is possible that some directors and managers may prefer that certain charter
amendments they have approved for submission to a vote of shareholders do not actually pass. If
this is the case, these directors and managers may be less concerned about the shortcomings of the
broker voting change, and may wish for it to remain in effect. Since the NYSE is funded by fees
from corporations and members, rather than from investors, it may have an incentive to take
actions preferred by those responsible for the corporation--directors and managers. If this were
the case, it might be unrealistic to expect the NYSE to act on its own initiative to solve the
problems created by the broker voting change. However, interviews with NYSE and SEC officials
suggest that this is not a realistic concern (notes of interviews with SEC and NYSE officials, on
file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
200. According to interviews with NYSE and SEC officials in relevant positions
at the time the broker voting change was implemented, the SEC requested that the NYSE issue the
broker voting change to amend its current practice rather than go through the rule-making
procedure. The SEC suggested that the prior treatment of broker votes on corporate governance
proposals had not been correct (notes of interviews with SEC and NYSE officials, on file with the
Yale Journal on Regulation). Both organizations may have a preference for a definitive answer in
the form of rulemaking, rather than a further reversal of the practice, which may be likely to create
confusion regarding the appropriate practice and its regulatory basis.
201. If the NYSE was not willing to submit a request for a change to its rules, it
is possible for the SEC to take action of its own volition. The SEC may be able to take action to
strike down the broker voting change, on the basis that it was a rule making, and not merely a
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Another alternative, discussed in a number of the solutions above, would
be private ordering, taken either by corporations, or by brokers. However,
given the perspective of directors and managers on the broker voting change
described in Section IV.D above, there are reasons to doubt that directors or
managers would undertake action to reverse its investor-harming effect of their
own volition. Instead, investors may need to engage with directors and
managers to encourage them to take such action. Given the number of
companies that would have to undertake individual action, this process is likely
to be considerably slower than a regulatory solution. Since there are a smaller
number of brokers, a broker-based private ordering solution may be more
efficient.
Given the time that an SEC or private ordering process is likely to take, it
would be optimal for the NYSE-if necessary, at the request of the SEC-to
first take action to reverse the broker voting change, so as to avoid the investor-
harming effects of the broker voting change on companies bringing charter
amendments in the interim.
Conclusion
Broker voting rules create the possibility of two kinds of distortion. If
brokers are permitted to vote and follow management recommendations, then
broker voting will positively distort vote tallies, and may result in a distorted
pass result for a proposal. The NYSE implemented the broker voting change to
prevent such distortions. However, the broker voting change's elimination of
broker voting has another distorting effect: reducing vote tallies from the value
they would have had if the preferences of all shareholders were considered.
When disqualifying brokers from voting results in a proposal failing where
shareholders would have preferred that it passed, there will be a "distorted fail."
Distorted fails have been the unintended consequence of the broker voting
change. As a result, parts of the charters of a substantial number of corporations
are frozen. The shareholders of a number of corporations are unable to amend
their bylaws, and certain corporations now permit insiders a de facto veto over
charter amendments. Given current levels of support for management
proposals, these effects significantly outweigh the possibility of distorted pass
outcomes that the broker voting change was designed to address. As a result,
although the broker voting change has an implicit investor protection rationale,
its effect has been the opposite: many charter amendments that investors favor
as being in their interests and value-enhancing can no longer be implemented.
The implicit change in the amendment erm of the charter also undermines the
policy change, and therefore should have been undertaken through the rule making process.
Alternatively, the SEC has the power to unilaterally amend the rules of the NYSE. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2012). A rule-making process under the aegis of
the SEC would also be preferable to a policy change through the broker voting change, as it would
follow the same well-developed process discussed in Section IV.E.
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corporate contract. I propose a number of potential solutions to these problems.
At the very least, and as an interim measure, the broker voting change should
be reversed. The NYSE and SEC should then work together to develop a policy
for the treatment of broker votes on corporate governance proposals that
reduces both kinds of potential distortion. The most promising potential
solutions appear to be either proportional voting or defining a set of corporate
governance matters on which brokers could and could not vote. In this way, the
investor protection rationale of broker voting reform could be upheld.
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Appendix A: Distorted Fail and Distorted Pass Outcomes, 2012-14
Table A.1: Failed Charter Amendments Receiving >90% of Votes Cast
Broker %~ % For + Result if%oFor r r  Broker e ti
Company Year %Fr Votes Req'd Vrote B Vs
os(a) (a " Votes permitted
Alcoa Inc. 2012 47.3% 25.6% 80.0% 72.8% Fail
Avista Corporation 2012 74.6% 11.8% 80.0% 86.4% Pass
Duke Energy 2012 52.7% 28.8% 80.0% 81.6% Pass
Corporation
Franklin Street 2012 70.6% 16.6% 80.0% 87.1% Pass
Properties Corp.
Hercules Offshore, 2012 67.5% 21.9% 75.0% 89.4% Pass
Inc.
PPG Industries, Inc. 2012 67.1% 12.6% 80.0% 79.8% Fail
Piedmont Natural Gas 2012 54.5% 28.5% 80.0% 83.1% Pass
Company, Inc.
Principal Financial 2012 58.1% 5.9% 75.0% 64.0% Fail
Group, Inc.
SUPERVALU INC. 2012 50.5% 24.1% 75.0% 74.6% Fail
Solta Medical, Inc. 2012 61.1% 22.9% 66.7% 84.0% Pass
St. Jude Medical, Inc. 2012 77.8% 9.1% 80.0% 87.0% Pass
Teradata Corporation 2012 75.9% 7.9% 80.0% 83.8% Pass
AkamaiTehoi 2013 73.2% 10.9% 75.0% 84.1% PassTechnologies, Inc.
Apache Corporation 2013 73.9% 9.5% 80.0% 83.4% Pass
Avista Corporation 2013 73.8% 12.9% 80.0% 86.7% Pass
Capital One Financial 2013 80.0% 5.5% 80.0% 85.4% Pass
Corporation
Chesapeake Energy 2013 60.1% 22.4% 66.7% 82.6% Pass
Corporation
Cliffs NaturalReous Nc 2013 46.7% 17.4% 50.0% 64.1% PassResources Inc.
Connecticut Water 2013 57.9% 25.3% 80.0% 83.2% Pass
Service, Inc.
Emerson Electric Co. 2013 71.2% 14.3% 85.0% 85.4% Pass
Energen Corporation 2013 78.3% 8.9% 80.0% 87.3% Pass
FirstEnergy Corp. 2013 73.3% 11.7% 80.0% 85.1% Pass
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% For + Result if
Year % For Broker % Broker B Vs(afr Votes Req'd Votes permittedCompany Year (afo) (abv) (area) (aor+ab)
L-3 Communications 2013 79.3% 8.8% n/a 88.1% Fail
Holdings, Inc. II
Marathon Petroleum 2013 74.2% 9.2% 80.0% 83.4% Pass
Corporation
Masco Corporation 2013 76.5% 5.0% 80.0% 81.5% Pass
Mattersight 2013 69.2% 19.7% 80.0% 88.9% PassCorporationI
ModusLink Global 2013 60.9% 0.0% 75.0% 60.9% Fail
Solutions, Inc.
NYSE Euronext 2013 63.7% 16.5% 80.0% 80.2% Pass
OGE Energy Corp. 2013 65.3% 16.4% 80.0% 81.7% Pass
PPG Industries, Inc. 2013 68.4% 12.3% 80.0% 80.7% Pass
Principal Financial 2013 61.4% 4.0% 75.0% 65.4% Fail
Group, Inc.
QEP Resources, Inc. 2013 77.5% 9.1% 80.0% 86.7% Pass
Reinsurance Group of
America, 2013 81.5% 4.4% 85.0% 85.9% Pass
Incorporated
SPX Corporation 2013 78.0% 6.1% 80.0% 84.1% Pass
SouthsideBanesbae 2013 56.2% 26.2% 66.7% 82.4% PassBancshares, Inc.
St. Jude Medical, Inc. 2013 77.2% 8.9% 80.0% 86.1% Pass
The Goodyear Tire & 2013 70.2% 14.8% 66.7% 85.0% Pass
Rubber Company
Allegheny
Technologies 2014 72.8% 8.8% 75.0% 81.6% Pass
Incorporated
Apache Corporation 2014 77.4% 7.9% 80.0% 85.3% Pass
Avista Corporation 2014 70.8% 16.0% 80.0% 86.8% Pass
CME Group Inc. 2014 75.1% 0.0% 50.0% 75.1% Pass
Capital One Financial 2014 80.9% 4.8% 80.0% 85.8% Pass
Corporation
Casella Waste 2014 65.9% 11.5% 75.0% 77.4% Pass
Systems, Inc.
Dover Corporation 2014 76.6% 8.2% 80.0% 84.8% Pass
GovernmentPopertienc 2014 59.3% 30.6% 66.7% 89.9% PassProperties Income
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Broker % Result if
% For Boker Broker BVs
(afd Votes Req' d Votes permitted
Company Year fr (ab) (areq) pedfo+ab)
Trust
Hecla Mining 2014 41.1% 32.3% 80.0% 73.4% Fail
Company
Hess Corporation 2014 79.6% 8.2% 80.0% 87.8% Pass
Higher One Holdings, 2014 77.8% 14.0% 80.0% 91.8% Pass
Inc.
MFA Financial, Inc. 2014 68.5% 19.1% 80.0% 87.6% Pass
ModusLink Global 2014 58.0% 21.9% 75.0% 79.9% Pass
Solutions, Inc.
Molycorp, Inc. 2014 49.5% 26.8% 66.7% 76.3% Pass
NCR Corporation 2014 78.4% 9.6% 80.0% 88.0% Pass
PPG Industries, Inc. 2014 67.1% 13.0% 80.0% 80.1% Pass
Piedmont Natural Gas 2014 59.0% 25.7% 80.0% 84.7% Pass
Company, Inc.
Public Service
Enterprise Group 2014 72.5% 14.5% 80.0% 87.0% Pass
Incorporated
Rentech, Inc. 2014 64.8% 19.8% 66.7% 84.6% Pass
Rockwell Collins, 2014 73.1% 11.4% 80.0% 84.5% Pass
Inc.
SCANA Corporation 2014 62.4% 19.6% 80.0% 82.0% Pass
SPX Corporation 2014 76.7% 5.5% 80.0% 82.2% Pass
Select Income REIT 2014 37.7% 7.8% 66.7% 45.5% Fail
St. Jude Medical, Inc. 2014 75.1% 8.8% 80.0% 83.9% Pass
Teradata Corporation 2014 73.8% 9.3% 80.0% 83.2% Pass
WindstreamHins, In 2014 48.0% 36.8% 66.7% 84.8% PassHoldings, Inc.
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Table A.2: Failed Bylaw Amendments Receiving >90% of Votes Cast,
2012-14
%oFor+
Broker % Bror Result if
Company Year Votes Req'd B Vs
(afor) (ab0) (areq)
202  Votes permitted
(afor+ab)
Boston Scientific 2012 78.9% 6.6% 80.0% 85.5% Pass
Corporation II
Chesapeake Energy 2012 62.0% 19.0% 66.7% 81.0% Pass
Corporation
Cigna Corporation 2012 72.0% 9.3% 80.0% 81.3% Pass
Piedmont NaturalPiedmomn INcr 2012 54.5% 28.5% 80.0% 83.0% PassGas Company, Inc.II
SUPERVALU INC. 2012 50.5% 24.1% 75.0% 74.6% Fail
Cleco Corporation 2013 76.3% 9.2% 80.0% 85.6% Pass
The Goodyear Tire & 2013 70.4% 14.8% 66.7% 85.2% Pass
Rubber Company
NxStage Medical, 2014 72.1% 15.2% 75.0% 87.3% Pass
Inc.
Piedmont NaturalGasdComn INc.r 2014 59.2% 25.7% 80.0% 84.9% Pass
Gas Company, Inc.
Rentech, Inc. 2014 66.5% 19.8% 66.7% 86.3% Pass
202. Note that all of the bylaw amendments had "shares outstanding"
supermajority requirements. This is unsurprising: votes cast requirement are normally a
supermajority and would not have resulted in failures if supported by greater than 90% of the
votes cast.
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Table A.3: Management Proposals Receiving Less Than 50% Shareholder
Support, 2012-14 (Majority of Votes Cast Standard)
Votes For
and
Broker Result if% Votes Broker Vtsa ~ oe
Company Year Type of Cast For Votes Votes as BVs votedPrpsl% of in favor
Proposal (Ifor) (a Votes
Cast
68for-lbv
FRED'S Inc. 2012 Other 14.3% 6.3% 19.9% Fail
Green Plains Amend2012 40.4% 0.0% 40.4% Fail
Inc. Charter
Obagi Medical 2012 Other 36.6% 4.8% 39.9% Fail
Products, Inc.
Pacific
Sunwear of 2012 Other 48.4% 11.9% 55.0% Pass
California, Inc.
Viad Corp 2012 Other 43.4% 4.2% 46.0% Fail
Benchmark
Electronics, 2013 Other 46.8% 4.2% 49.2% Fail
Inc.
Wynn Resorts, 2014 Amend 39.9% 6.3% 44.1% Fail
Limited Bylaws
Table A.4: Management Proposals Receiving <50% Shareholder Support,
2012-14 (Majority of Votes Outstanding Standard)
00 For and
% Broker Frad Result if
Company Year Type of Outst. Votes Broker Resulted
Proposal Cast For Vote Votes B Vs voted
(afo) (for+ab in favor
Cameron Amend
International 2012 40.1% 2.9% 43.0% Fail
Corporation Charter
Healthcare Amend




Appendix B: The Broker Voting Change and the Likelihood of Charter
Amendment Failure
To test empirically whether the broker voting change had a signficant
effect on the likelihood of failure of a particular proposal, I use a logistic
regression model. I use a binary variable for whether the vote passes or fails (1
or 0, respectively), as the dependent variable. My key independent variable is
whether the vote took place between 2012 and 2014 (a binary variable taking
the value 1 for 2012 to 2014 and 0 for previous years). Given the importance of
supermajority voting requirements, I control for the voting requirement
necessary to approve the vote (req). In a second specification, I add an
interaction term between the vote requirement and the time. The two
specifications can be written as follows:
f(Fail) = a + b,.Time + b2. Ctrq + e
f(Fail) = a + b1.Time + b2. "req + b3.Time, aeq + e
Given the low likelihood of failure with a votes cast standard, I exclude
votes that did not have a votes outstanding requirement. I cluster standard
errors by company. My results are set out in Table B.1 below.






Time (2012-2014) (0.180) (1.303)
7.028*** 4.441***
Vote Required (0.867) (1.050)
6.570***




Chi2  90.72 125.01
Difference in Odds Ratios for Time 0.1006 0.0489
(Time = 1 - Time = 0)
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As Table B.1 shows, whether or not the vote took place after the broker
voting change is significant at the 1% level in determining the probability of
the vote failing. In the second model, which shows a better degree of fit, the
likelihood of a proposal failing increases 4.9% if the proposal took place after
the broker voting change.
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Appendix C: Charter Amendments and Director Election Turnout
In Part III, I used director election turnout to predict the companies that
are likely to have frozen charters. This approach is predicated on a number of
key assumptions. First, it assumes that turnout for director election proposals at
a particular meeting is correlated with turnout for corporate governance
proposals. Second, it assumes that turnout for director election proposals is
unaffected by whether there is a corporate governance proposal being voted on
at the election or is affected in a consistent way. In this Appendix C, I examine
the validity of each of these assumptions.
A. Correlation with Director Election Turnout
In order to test the assumption that turnout for corporate governance
proposals is correlated with the turnout for director election proposals at a
particular meeting, I use data for meetings taking place after the broker voting
change took effect. After that time broker votes are excluded from vote tallies
for both director election proposals and corporate governance proposals,
permitting a simple calculation of the correlation between the two.
Figure C.1 below shows turnout for director election proposals and
corporate governance proposals.
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Director Vote Turnout
As Figure C.1 illustrates, director election proposal turnout and corporate
governance proposal turnout are almost perfectly correlated, with a correlation
coefficient of 99.9%. Figure C.1 makes clear that there are a small number of
meetings-seven out of 379 meetings, or 1.8%-where corporate governance
turnout varies from director voting turnout by more than 1%; these are likely to
be instances of irregularities in the treatment or disclosure of broker non-
votes.203
This has intuitive support-director election proposals and corporate
governance proposals appear on the same proxy card. There seems to be little
reason to believe that a shareholder would vote on one proposal and not the
other. The largest shareholders of most corporations are mutual funds and
pension funds, which have fiduciary duties to vote their shares.204 This gives
confidence that director election proposal turnout can be used as a proxy for
corporate governance proposal turnout.
203. The meetings where there was such a variance were the 2012 meeting of
Cigna Corporation, the 2012 meeting of Redwood Trust, Inc., the 2013 meeting of Tredegar
Corporation, the 2013 meeting of Walter Investment Management Corp., the 2013 meeting of Joy
Global Inc., the 2014 meeting of The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., and the 2013 meeting of Live
Nation Entertainment, Inc.
204. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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B. Turnout in Director Elections When a Corporate Governance Proposal Is
Also Being Voted on
In the model described in in Part III, I use turnout in director elections as a
proxy for the expected turnout if there were a corporate governance proposal at
a particular company. However, in the elections I am using to make
predictions, there are no corporate governance proposals being voted on.
Therefore my predictions depend on the assumption that turnout will be the
same where there is not a corporate governance proposal on the ballot (the data
I am using) and when there is a corporate governance proposal on the ballot
(the situations I am trying to predict). There are reasons to suggest hat this may
not be the case. Shareholders may be aware of the possibility of a frozen
charter, and therefore the importance of voting, and may be more likely to vote
at such meetings. Alternatively, if managers of corporations putting forward a
corporate governance proposal wish the proposal to succeed, they may hire a
proxy solicitor, who will take active steps to increase shareholder turnout,
either by sending additional correspondence to shareholders encouraging them
to vote, or by telephoning shareholders to encourage them to vote.
To examine this assumption, I look at that set of companies that had a
corporate governance proposal in a particular year, t, and that did not have a
corporate governance proposal in the previous year, t-1. I look at years from
2010 onwards, when broker votes were excluded on director election proposals.
I compare director election turnout in the year with the corporate governance
proposal on the ballot (ctot), and turnout in the previous year (ato~t-). Figure
C.2, below, plots Ctt,, against a 0to,tl, as well as the trendline of the data, and a
line showing equality.
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Figure C.2: Scatterplot of Turnout in Years with a Corporate Governance
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As Figure C.2 illustrates, there is a strong correlation between director
election turnout in years where there is a corporate governance proposal on the
ballot and years where there is not (a correlation of 76.4%), but with some
significant variation year to year. While there is some variation from a perfect
correlation (shown by divergence from the 450 line), this is likely to be the
result of random year-to-year variation in turnout. For comparison, Figure C.3
below compares director election proposal turnout in years when there is no
corporate governance proposal on the ballot from director election turnout in
the same company in the previous years, in which there is also no corporate
governance proposal on the ballot.
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Figure C.3: Scatterplot of Turnout in Years Without a Corporate Governance
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Figure C.3 exhibits similar variation to Figure C.2, albeit with a slightly
higher correlation (82.7%). However, there are a similar number of outlying
observations with significant year-to-year variation. The trendline in both
Figure C.2 and Figure C.3 shows some mean reversion-that firms with lower
turnout in the previous year have higher turnout in the following year, and vice
versa-but not a systematic bias toward an increase in turnout among
companies that moved from not having a proposal to having a proposal.
To test this relationship, I generate a metric, aAto, that calculates the
increase in director election turnout, a,, from year t-1 to director election
turnout in year t, as follows:




I split firm-years in my sample into four types: those with no corporate
governance proposal in year t-I or year t ('0,0' firm-years); those with a
corporate governance proposal in year t-1 but not in year t ('1,0' firm-years);
those with no corporate governance proposal in year t-1 but a corporate
governance proposal in year t ('0,1' firm-years); and those with corporate
governance proposals in each year ('1,1' firm-years). Table C.A below
illustrates the breakdown, and shows the number of firm-years in each
category.
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Table C. 1: Breakdown of Years in Sample Based on Corporate Governance




No Corporate (0, 0) firm-years (0,1) firm-years
Governance Proposal 812 firm-years 432 firm-years
Corporate (1,0) firm-years (1,1) firm-years
Governance Proposal 347 firm-years 60 firm-years
Figure C.4 below shows the distribution of aAto for (0,0) and (0,1) firm-
years.
Figure C.4: Distribution of o.Ato for (0,0) and (0,1) Firm-Years
- - - - (0,0)
_ (0,1)
-60% -10% 40% 90% 140%
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If there were a systematic increase between years without a corporate
governance proposal and years with a corporate governance proposal, we
would expect to see the (0,1) firm-year distribution slightly to the right of the
(0,0) distribution. However, as Figure C.4 shows, there is no obvious difference
between the two distributions.
If there were no systematic increase in a year in which there is a corporate
governance proposal, then we would expect the mean of the distribution for
years in which there is a corporate governance proposal to be the same as the
mean of the distribution in years where there is no proposal. Table C.2 below
shows the means for of acto0 and for the samples of aAto where there is a
proposal and there is no proposal, and the results of t-tests for the differences
between years where there is a proposal and where there is no proposal.
Table C.2: Comparison of Means of Firm-Years (0,1) and (0,0)
Firm-year n Mean c A Std. Error 95% Conf. Interval
(0,1) 432 0.0076 0.0058 -0.0038 0.0189
(0,0) 812 0.0165 0.0038 0.0091 0.0240
(0,1) - (0,0) -0.0090 0.0067 -0.0221 0.0041
t-testt =-1.345 d.f. = 1242
(0,1) - (0,0)> 0
Pr( (0,1) - (0,0) > 0) 0.0894
Contrary to expectations, the mean of the (0,1) group is lower than the
mean of the (0,0) group, by 0.00899. That is, the change in turnout from firm-
years where there was no proposal in year t-1 to a proposal in year t is less than
the increase between two years when there was no proposal in either year, by
0.8%. However, the results of the t-test for the difference of means is
probability of that this difference is greater than zero is only 0.0894.
However, this is not the end of the matter. The lack of effect over the
entire group of corporate governance proposals may belie an effect in the
subset of companies that I am concerned with that is nonetheless washed out by
a lack of effect among other companies. Consider when a corporation may
employ a proxy solicitor to try and increase its turnout in order to increase the
likelihood that a corporate governance proposal passes. Having a proxy
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solicitor increase turnout is expensive, so a rational board of directors will not
employ such measures in all instances. If the board believes the shareholder
proposal is likely to pass without any intervention, there is no need to employ a
proxy solicitor. Assuming strong shareholder support for a proposal, this is
likely to be the case if the turnout in the previous year was above the voting
requirement for the proposal. If the proposal is likely to fail even if a proxy
solicitor is employed, then the corporation is also unlikely to expend the
resources in a futile effort. This is likely to be the case if the firm has a
supermajority requirement, and turnout in the previous year was significantly
below the vote required for the proposal to pass. Only if the proposal is likely
to fail by a small margin if a proxy solicitor is not employed might the
corporation consider employing a proxy solicitor and increasing its turnout.205
Table C.3 below shows the corresponding means and t-test, where the
sample of firms to those where there was a supermajority requirement, and the
turnout in year t-1 was less than the vote required (careq) but still within 0.10 of
areq, i.e.:
areq -- 0.1 < atotI < tCreq.
Table C.3: Comparison of Means of Firm-Years (0,1)
Within 0.10 of areq
and (0,0) Where ctto,t_1 Is
Firm-year n Mean a do Std. Error 95% Conf Interval
(0,1) 36 0.0081 0.0140 -0.0202 0.0365
(0,0) 70 0.0188 0.0091 0.0006 0.0370
(0,1) -(0,0) -0.0107 0.0162 -0.0427 0.0214
-testt =-0.659 d.f. = 104
(01 1) -(01 0) >0 t-.5
Pr( (0,1) - (0,0) > 0) 0.256
Table C.3 shows the expected sign for the mean change in turnout-i.e.,
that there was, on average, a very small (0.8%) increase in turnout in firm years
205. For an analysis of strategic employment of proxy solicitors in the context of
shareholder proposals, see Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 159 (2008).
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with corporate governance proposals, where the previous year's turnout was
close to but below the vote required. However, Table C.3 again shows a lower
change between firm-years where there was no proposal and when there was a
proposal, than between two firm-years in which there was no proposal, despite
the sample being limited to situations where management would be more likely
to employ a proxy solicitor.
20 6
I also consider this question within a multivariate model, using a panel
data set. I once again use as the dependent variable the proportionate change in
turnout from the previous year. I include dummy variables for each of the sets
of firm-years described above as (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1). The base case, where
each of these dummy variables is zero, represents the set of firm-years
described above as (0,0). In a second specification of this model, I also use
dummy variables that take the value of 1 where the turnout in the previous year
is below the vote requirement by less than 0.10 (Careq - atto,t-l < 0.10). Table C.4
below shows the results.
206. A test of firms that had turnout in year t-1 of less than a,,q but still within
0.05 of Oreq, i.e., armq - 0.05 < ato,t1 < treq, "not reported" shows a similar result.
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Table C.4: Results of Multivariate Regression
Variables (1) (2)
a~d to a Alto
-0.0113" -0.0096
Firm years (0,1) -1.71 -1.38
-0.00859 -0.00834
Firm year (1,0) -1.16 -1.12
-0.0164 -0.0188




areq 0- .1 < a ,_1 < a q 
2.1
Firm year (0,1) x -0.01845
areq - 0.1 < ago,t-1 < ar, -0.94
0.0182*** 0.0141***Constant
6.85 3.98
R2  0.0012 0.0016
N 1,651 1,651
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes
As before, the coefficients are not significant and are in fact negative, and this
suggests that there is no increase in the event of a shareholder proposal being on the
ballot (and there may be a very small decrease). This is also the case for the
coefficient on the interaction term for (0,1) firm years where the turnout is within
10% of the vote requirements-even in those cases, director election turnout
decreased in the year where there was a corporate governance proposal on the
ballot.
The foregoing analysis allows the rejection of the possibility that turnout
might increase in the event that a corporate governance proposal is included on the
ballot.
Vol. 34, 2017
